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Abstract Models of conversation that rely on a strong notion of cooperation
don’t apply to strategic conversation — that is, to conversation where the
agents’ motives don’t align, such as courtroom cross examination and politi-
cal debate. We provide a game-theoretic framework that provides an analysis
of both cooperative and strategic conversation. Our analysis features a new
notion of safety that applies to implicatures: an implicature is safe when it
can be reliably treated as a matter of public record. We explore the safety
of implicatures within cooperative and non cooperative settings. We then
provide a symbolic model enabling us (i) to prove a correspondence result be-
tween a characterisation of conversation in terms of an alignment of players’
preferences and one where Gricean principles of cooperative conversation
like Sincerity hold, and (ii) to show when an implicature is safe and when it
is not.
Keywords: non-cooperative conversation, implicature, discourse coherence, game
theory, cognitive modelling
1 Introduction
A theory of dialogue should link discourse interpretation and production
to general principles of rational action and decision-making. Grice (1975)
and his followers provide a theory meeting this constraint when conver-
sational actions obey a strong cooperative principle. On this view, agents
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cooperate on a level of intentions: once an agent in a conversation learns
of someone’s conversational goals he either adopts them and attempts to
realise them, or he says why he can’t adopt them. In technical work, this
principle is sometimes expressed in terms of aligned utilities (van Rooij 2004,
Lewis 1969). This principle leads agents to coordinate on the conventions
that govern linguistic meaning (basic cooperativity) and on intentions about
conversational goals, what we’ll call Gricean cooperativity.
But Gricean cooperativity is a hallmark of only some kinds of conversa-
tion. Consider the cross-examination in (1) of a defendant by a prosecutor,
from Solan & Tiersma 2005 (thanks to Chris Potts for this example):
(1) a. P(rosecutor): Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr.
Bronston?
b. B(ronston): No, sir.
c. P: Have you ever?
d. B: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.
The locutionary content of (1d) is true. But Bronston deflects the prosecu-
tor’s enquiry by exploiting a misleading implicature, or misdirection: (1d)
implicates that Bronston never had a Swiss bank account and this is false.
As Solan & Tiersma (2005) point out, what’s a matter of public record, what
a speaker publicly commits to, can be a matter of debate. We agree with
their judgement that Bronston’s implicature is plausibly part of the public
record but that he can also defensibly deny that he publicly committed to
that answer.
Misdirections happen outside the courtroom too. Consider dialogue (2)
uttered in a context where Janet is trying to get Justin, who is the jealous
type, off her back about her old boyfriend Valentino (from Chris Potts (pc)).
(2) a. Justin: Have you been seeing Valentino this past week?
b. Janet: Valentino has mononucleosis.
Suppose that Valentino indeed has mononucleosis. Janet’s response impli-
cates that she hasn’t seen Valentino, an implicature which we think holds
even if she has seen him and/or Justin isn’t confident that Janet shares his
intentions to get a true and informative answer to his question (2a). But
as with (1d), Janet can defensibly deny that she committed to the negative
answer.
Dialogues like (1) and (2) exhibit what we call rhetorical cooperativity, but
not Gricean cooperativity. A rhetorically cooperative move is a speech act
one would expect from a speaker who fully cooperates with his interlocutor.
Rhetorical cooperativity makes a speaker appear to be Gricean cooperative
although he may not actually be so. This is a frequent feature of strategic con-
versations, in which agents’ interests do not align. Here are some examples
of rhetorically cooperative speech acts: a rhetorically cooperative response
to a question implies either an answer or that the respondent doesn’t know
the answer; a rhetorically cooperative response to an assertion either implies
that the assertion is grounded or it identifies why it’s not (Clark 1996); a
rhetorically cooperative response to a greeting returns the greeting. It might
seem that responses follow from and in turn suggest Gricean cooperativity;
nevertheless, rhetorical cooperativity and Gricean cooperativity are, as we
will argue, independent notions.
In this paper, we explore rhetorical cooperativity, which we take to be a
basic phenomenon, in the absence of Gricean cooperativity. In Section 2 we
formally characterise Gricean cooperativity and sketch how these principles
can yield implicatures. We then show that our Gricean theory has too few
tools to model the implicatures that we and others (Solan & Tiersma 2005)
claim are drawn from (1d) or (2b). We formulate in Section 3 a general theory
of conversation that’s based on preferences and discourse coherence, which
we implement in Section 4 in a classic game theoretic framework. This
models rhetorical cooperativity in detail, accounts for the implicatures in (1d)
and (2b), and highlights an important difference between Gricean cooperative
conversations and non cooperative ones. The difference between a Gricean
cooperative conversation and a non cooperative version of the same exchange
lies not in the implicatures that can be drawn from it, as the Gricean would
have it, but in what we’ll call the safety of the implicatures: the reliability
of inferences about what message a speaker conveyed. Despite the rigour
and clarity of the game-theoretic model, it tells us what agents should do but
doesn’t tell us anything about the mistakes they make or how they actually
reason about conversation. To rectify this, we provide in Sections 5 and 6
a proof-theoretic counterpart to the game theoretic model where we sketch
how resource-bounded agents might reason about conversation. We provide
principles that allow us to infer (i) when inferences about conversation are
safe, and (ii) that Gricean cooperativity is equivalent to an alignment of the
agents’ preferences (proofs are in the Appendix).
2 Problems for Gricean analyses of strategic conversation
In cooperative conversation, people normally believe what they say and help
other agents achieve the goals they reveal through their utterances. Following
Asher & Lascarides (2003), we offer below one way to make some of Grice’s
(1975) maxims a bit more precise, by appealing to defeasible generalisations.
• Rationality: normally, people act so as to realise their intentions.
• Sincerity: Normally agents who say φ should believe φ.
• Quantity: Normally, agents say as much as they need to, given their
conversational goals.
• Competence: Normally, if B believes that A believes φ, then B should
believe φ.
• Sincerity about Intentions: Normally if A M-intends φ (that is, A’s
utterance implies that A intends φ and intends that this intention be
recognised), then A intends that φ.
• Strong Cooperativity : Normally, if A M-intends that φ, then B should
intend that φ.
It is important to understand what these defeasible generalisations say and
don’t say. Strong Cooperativity, for example, doesn’t say that the hearer’s
recognition of an M-intention or conversational goal always leads the hearer
to adopt this intention; it says that in the absence of factors to the contrary,
the hearer will do so.
We also assume that additional defeasible rules link speech acts to inten-
tions: for instance, if an agent asks a question, then normally he M-intends
to know the answer to it (that is, this speech act implies that he intends to
know an answer, and intends that this intention be recognised). The above
default rules are proposed purely for the sake of concreteness; for a different
but largely equivalent approach see e.g., Schulz 2007.
Such rules provide the basis for inferring implicatures, including inter
alia scalar implicatures. These inferences are of the form that in saying u,
perhaps in contrast to some set of alternative utterances that the speaker
could have said but didn’t, one infers that the speaker meant p, where p goes
beyond the compositional and lexical semantics of u. Consider (3):
(3) a. A: Did all of the students pass?
b. B: Some passed.
Most interlocutors would infer from (3b) that B does not believe that all
the students passed. Here’s how this inference would follow given our
precisification of Gricean principles. Suppose that the chosen move, in
this case (3b), conforms to all the Gricean principles given above. Suppose
further that alternative moves that the speaker could have chosen but didn’t
(normally) deviate from at least one of those constraints. Suppose also that
it is given, either by discourse structure or by the lexicon, that the set of
alternatives to some in (3b) is {none, some, all}. Then an informal sketch of
the derivation of the scalar implicature proceeds as follows:
• Sincerity: (defeasibly) implies B believes his response to A’s question
(and so believes that the alternative move using none would deviate
from Sincerity). Competence (defeasibly) implies that A should believe
this response; i.e., that some students passed.
• Strong Cooperativity: B intends A to know an answer to his ques-
tion — that either all the students passed or they didn’t.
• Rationality: B’s response realises that intention; i.e., it provides A with
an answer.
• B didn’t say all the students passed, which would have implied an
answer. So choosing this alternative would not have deviated from
Strong Cooperativity or Quantity; it must therefore deviate from Sin-
cerity. So B doesn’t believe that all the students passed.
If in addition A believes that B knows an answer (as is often the case when A
asks a question as part of a plan to find out an answer), then the implicature
that B doesn’t believe that all students passed yields a stronger inference,
that B believes not all of them did, which by Competence A will (defeasibly)
adopt as his own belief too.
Rather than fully formalise this reasoning in a particular nonmonotonic
logic (see Asher 2013 or Schulz 2007 for some proposals), let’s step back and
consider its essential features. Specifically, it requires Strong Cooperativity
to derive scalar implicatures — that interlocutors normally adopt each other’s
conversational goals and that speakers tell the truth. Strong Cooperativity
makes precise what we mean by cooperativity at the level of intentions: once
an agent in a conversation learns of someone’s conversational goals he either
adopts them and attempts to realise them, or he says why he can’t.
But conversations can have purposes that deviate from strong cooper-
ativity: people talk to bargain, to bluff, to mislead, to show off or promote
themselves, to put others down. Such purposes lead people to misdirect and
to conceal information that’s crucial to the achievement of conversational
goals. Moreover such moves crucially exploit the fact that participants in
such conversations draw implicatures. But without Strong Cooperativity, the
above Gricean derivation fails: one can’t draw the scalar implicature.
This is directly relevant to our examples (1) and (2). Most competent
speakers, including the prosecutor himself, interpret Bronston’s response
as appealing to a scalar implicature that provides a (negative) answer to the
question.1 Indeed, the prosecutor and others interpret Bronston’s move this
way, even if they believe the implicature is false — that is, they believe or
have evidence that Bronston did have an account. The prosecutor wouldn’t
have tried (and convicted) Bronston for perjury if he didn’t have evidence
that contradicted the negative answer that he took Bronston as providing in
the trial.
But modelling this scalar implicature via just our Gricean principles
doesn’t work in this context: if an interpreter believes that Bronston had an
account (as the prosecutor did), then the consequent to the defeasible rule
Competence cannot be inferred. Furthermore, the prosecutor would infer
from his own belief that Bronston had an account that Bronston believes
he had an account (on the grounds that people have complete and accurate
information about the bank accounts they have); in other words, the prose-
cutor would infer that Sincerity doesn’t fire either. But then rationality would
dictate that Bronston wouldn’t have intended (1d) as a true and informative
answer to (1c), and this would follow only if he didn’t adopt the prosecutor’s
intention to provide the prosecutor with a true and informative answer. So
the situation is one where the consequent of Strong Cooperativity cannot
be inferred, and therefore there is no way to derive the implicature in this
situation.
If we rely only on our Gricean principles to compute implicatures, we
predict that in this context Bronston’s response is no different from one
that explicitly evades the question (e.g., I refuse to answer) or asserts some
random fact (e.g., I’m six feet tall). Since Strong Cooperativity doesn’t hold,
there is no way to run the defeasible reasoning that turns the response into
1 Solan & Tiersma (2005) argue for this position.
an indirect answer. That seems to us to be the wrong prediction. Anyone who
is a competent speaker construes Bronston’s response (1d) as being much
closer to an answer than an utterance of a random fact about Bronston, like
I’m six feet tall. It’s also not an explicit evasion of the question, like I prefer
not to answer the question.
The same problem applies to a Gricean analysis of (2). Our assumptions
about Justin’s suspicions entail that he must assume that he and Janet are
in a non-cooperative or strategic situation. Nevertheless intuitively, even
though Justin assumes that Janet won’t adopt his intention to know an
answer, Justin, and we, take Janet’s response to be an indirect answer to
his question. To obtain this interpretation, Justin must engage in some
defeasible reasoning to connect the response (2b) with the question (2a). Note
that this doesn’t entail that Justin accept the answer or find it credible: we
are interested only in what information Justin extracts from it. Of course,
Janet can argue she is committed only to the factual content of her claim.
But we assume that her choice to utter (2b) is based on the fact that as a
competent conversationalist, she realises that (2b) is naturally interpreted
as a (negative) indirect answer. She picks that response as one that best
realises her goals, because she knows that interpreting (2b) as an answer to
(2a) involves some defensible, but defeasible, reasoning on Justin’s part, and
that she has the option of denying that his reasoning is sound in the present
case or that she was completely responsible for it. In any case, for both Justin
and Janet, the consequence of Strong Cooperativity isn’t inferable. Thus a
Gricean can’t generate the implicature as part of the interpretation of (2b).
So contrary to intuitions, a Gricean must predict that Janet’s response, like
Bronston’s, is no different from an assertion of some random fact.
Notice that misdirection is quite different from lying. Suppose that Janet
had lied by saying No to Justin’s question (2a). The linguistic meaning of the
answer, assuming just rhetorical cooperativity, would be clear: No means that
Janet hasn’t been seeing Valentino. Similarly for Bronston’s direct answer in
(1b). Intuitively this case is different from the misdirections in (1d) and (2b).
The message in this discourse context is unambiguous and direct.
Our argument crucially relies on Strong Cooperativity, and we suspect that
many Griceans, e.g., Green (1995), will think it is too strongly worded. Green
argues that one should adopt no more of the intentions of the questioner than
is required for the conversational purpose, as Grice himself said. He adds as a
separate stipulation that the asking of a question invokes the conversational
purpose that the recipient give “a complete answer to the question if they
can” (Green 1995: p.107). But whose conversational purpose are we talking
about? Presumably the questioner’s. Without Strong Cooperativity, it doesn’t
follow that the recipient will adopt this conversational purpose. Without the
adoption of this purpose, we can’t infer that the recipient is answering the
question. Green and many other Griceans overlook the centrality of Strong
Cooperativity in a Gricean derivation of implicatures.
A Gricean might suggest that the difference between an assertion of just
any random fact and Janet’s actual response in (2) is the counterfactual claim
that had they been in a cooperative situation, Janet’s response would have
been an indirect answer, while an assertion of some random fact would not.
Nevertheless, it’s hard to see what this counterfactual claim does for the
interpretation of Janet’s response in the actual context. In the counterfactual
Gricean cooperative context, Justin, we agree, would draw the implicature,
using the sort of reasoning we outlined above and the defeasible conclusions
of Strong Cooperativity. In the actual context, however, Justin is the jealous
type and so suspects that Janet doesn’t intend to provide a truthful answer.
He doesn’t believe that the consequent of Strong Cooperativity holds. Nev-
ertheless, he still draws the implicature; that’s why Justin will be justified
in being angry in the actual context, if he finds out Janet has been seeing
Valentino. Justin’s jealousy and his suspicions make him wary of the indirect
answer. However, not believing or being wary of the indirect answer is a
matter of credibility and belief about the information imparted; it’s not a
matter of what information is imparted by the response. Griceans have no
way of explaining why this is the case. For them it is irrational to draw the
implicature in the actual context, and it would be irrational for Justin to be
angry.2
An alternative constraint besides Strong Cooperativity would be to assume
that speakers make their contribution to the dialogue relevant to the dialogue
so far (cf. Grice’s maxim of Relevance). But this maxim is too weak to generate
the implicature on its own. To see why, consider replacing the inference
step where Strong Cooperativity is applied in our derivation of the scalar
implicature for (3b) with a maxim of relevance. Then it does not follow that B
2 A Gricean might argue that implicatures in the courtroom case arise from an exogenous
constraint on conversation like the oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth in a courtroom. To derive scalar implicatures from the oath, however, the Gricean
must stipulate that “nothing but the truth” entails all scalar implicatures. But this is far too
rigid an interpretation: if the oath did force all implicatures to be entailed, then the Supreme
Court would have had no business overturning Bronston’s conviction for perjury, which in
this case it did — in effect it would turn all implicatures into entailments.
feels compelled to supply an answer: a partial answer, or some other relevant
contribution such as a commentary on the question, would also be relevant.
Similarly, in (1d), a relevance maxim may distinguish this utterance from an
assertion of a random fact (in that (1d) is about holding Swiss bank accounts,
while being six foot tall has nothing to do with bank accounts). But it would
not, on its own, be enough to infer that (1d) implicates an answer: other
relevant semantic relations such as being a commentary on the question
would comply with the defeasible relevance constraint too.
We suspect that Gricean principles are not sufficient in strategic contexts
even to identify direct answers containing anaphoric elements as answers. To
interpret (1b) as a direct answer, we first have to assume it is somehow related
to (1a). Theories of discourse structure, like Question Under Discussion (qud,
Ginzburg (2012)) or Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (sdrt, Asher
& Lascarides (2003)) study such attachment decisions and attempt to predict
them. In such theories, an assumption that (1b) is attached to (1a) constrains
the antecedents to anaphoric expressions — in (1), the anaphor is no and the
assumption that it’s attached to the question (1a) forces its antecedent to
be the core proposition of (1a), thereby yielding its interpretation as a direct
answer. The theory of attachment and constraints on the interpretation of
anaphora in such discourse theories bypass entirely any reasoning about
mental states or cognitive states in this example, and they are sufficient to
infer an interpretation of (1b) as a direct answer to (1a).
Gricean inference doesn’t exploit discourse structure in this way, relying
instead on reasoning about mental states to augment the compositional
semantics of an utterance to a specific interpretation. (1a) was not dialogue
initial: there are many propositions in the context that could conceivably act
as antecedents to the anaphor in (1b). So even if one assumes that (1b) is a
response to (1a), then without the machinery of discourse structure being
used to constrain the interpretation of anaphora, we don’t see how a Gricean
can identify the appropriate antecedent to the anaphor without appealing to
Strong Cooperativity.
Strong Cooperativity can solve the problem we have just discussed. Con-
sider (4) which allows us to infer that (1b) is a direct answer to (1a):
(4) If response X can be interpreted as an answer to question Y, then nor-
mally interlocutors interpret X as an answer to Y.
Strong Cooperativity entails (4): the respondent makes it his own goal that
the questioner know a true answer to his question, and so by rationality the
respondent’s action is construed to be a part of a plan to satisfy that goal,
making an interpretation of no as a direct answer predictable, rational and
natural. But without Strong Cooperativity, the derivation of (4) fails. Suppose
that the prosecutor knew that Bronston did in fact have a bank account at
the time of question — i.e., that he was explicitly lying. Then Competence
and Sincerity fail, and as before the prosecutor concludes from this that
Bronston doesn’t share his conversational goals, which in turn undermines
the derivation of the implicature in (4). So we can’t even infer that (1b)
is a direct answer to (1a), at least not using Gricean inference alone. In
other words, using Gricean principles alone, one cannot infer that there is
rhetorical cooperativity unless there is also Gricean cooperativity. This is
completely counterintuitive: (1b) is clearly interpreted by everyone as a direct
answer, even if Bronston is lying. This is not a matter of credibility — whether
the response is believable — but in fact a problem of what information was
communicated. Something needs to supplement the Gricean picture, or to
replace it.3
A Gricean could retreat to the level of Bronston’s intentions. A Gricean
might claim that clearly Bronston has the intention of having the prosecutor
believe that he has answered both questions and the prosecutor recognises
that intention. But how is that intention recognised? It’s not by cooperativity
of intentions, for the reasons we have already given. Rather, the intention is
inferred because of basic linguistic norms that function at a discourse level,
regardless of cooperativity (Traum 1994, Poesio & Traum 1997, Traum et al.
2008). That is, the basic linguistic forms, together with the choice of which
part of the discourse context the current contribution attaches to, affects
content: it makes B’s response an answer in both (1b) and (1d). Implicatures
thus flow from the discourse structure, rather than the other way round as
in Grice.4 These are linguistic norms that theories of discourse structure
3 Of course (4) doesn’t entail Strong Cooperativity. We could use (4) on its own or other such
principles to construct rhetorical cooperativity. We believe that Green (1995) has something
like this view, and it also accords with our prior work (Asher & Lascarides 2003). But if
one does this, the Gricean Principles become irrelevant for deriving rhetorical cooperativity,
which we believe is as it should be.
4 For a detailed argument on this score, see Asher 2012, 2013.
try to capture — they facilitate meaning making by resolving the meaning
of each communicative act through constrained inference over information
that’s made linguistically salient in the prior discourse. These norms are of
course compatible with a Gricean view of communication. But they don’t
follow from a Gricean picture of communication as enshrined in the maxims,
and they are also compatible with conversations which don’t feature Gricean
cooperativity.
To conclude, people often communicate in the context of diverging in-
terests — any time you want to bargain for a car, invest in stocks, play a
competitive game, get your parents to do something for you, your interests
may fail to align with those of your conversational partners. Nevertheless,
people continue to draw implicatures like those we’ve discussed. They draw
these implicatures when cooperativity at the level of intentions is lacking, and
the Gricean makes a false prediction if he takes implicatures to be generated
entirely from cooperative principles associated with the maxims. So rather
than force derivations of implicatures in strategic contexts into a model that
is based on cooperativity of intentions, we will provide in the next sections
an alternative foundation for deriving implicatures, which handles contexts
where the agents’ preferences and intentions diverge, as well as cases where
they are aligned.
3 Our model
We hold that the following three features should be a part of any general
model of conversation:
Public vs. Private: Speaking makes an agent publicly commit to some content
(Hamblin 1987). A dialogue model must distinguish private attitudes
from public commitments.
Coherence: Messages must be interpreted with respect to an underlying
model of discourse coherence; likewise, decisions about what to say
are influenced by coherence.
Levels of cooperativity: The model of dialogue must distinguish several
levels of cooperativity, distinguishing at least rhetorical cooperativity
from full Gricean cooperativity.
Insincerity motivates the Public vs. Private distinction. Many traditional
mentalist models of dialogue based on Grice equate dialogue interpretation
with updating mental states. For instance, interpreting an assertion that p is
equivalent to updating the model of the speaker’s mental state to include a
belief in p (e.g., Allen & Litman 1987, Grosz & Sidner 1990, Lochbaum 1998).
But they are not equivalent in (1); we interpret Bronston’s move (1d) as an
indirect answer even if we know that Bronston believes the negation of its
implied answer, making Bronston’s beliefs inconsistent with the dialogue’s
interpretation. And we interpret (1b) as a direct answer to (1a) even if we
know B believes he has a bank account.
The idea that a model of dialogue should distinguish a public record of
discourse content from the private information about the agents’ mental
states isn’t new: concepts such as common ground (Stalnaker 2002) have
been proposed and motivated on the basis of several phenomena, including
grounding (Clark 1996, Traum 1994), presupposition (Lewis 1969, Green
2000) and anaphora (Asher & Lascarides 2003). Insincerity provides another
motivation. However, there is a link between the public record and private
attitudes and to articulate this link, we say that speakers publicly commit to
their contribution to the dialogue (Hamblin 1987, Traum 1994, Lascarides &
Asher 2008). Thus, the principle of Sincerity says that a speaker normally
believes what he publicly commits to.
Based on our discussion in Section 2, the fact that speakers commit to
content that goes beyond that expressed by a sentence in isolation motivates
the constraint of Coherence. For example, the fact that (1b) commits Bron-
ston to an answer to (1a) entails a commitment to a coherent and specific
interpretation of those utterances, with anaphoric expressions resolved to
specific values. Models of discourse interpretation that exploit coherence
assume that each discourse move bears at least one coherence relation to at
least one other part of the discourse, and that resolving aspects of content
like identifying antecedents to anaphora or resolving linguistic ambiguities
depends on the discourse coherence (Hobbs 1979, Asher 1993, Kehler 2002).
Coherence relations are an irreducible part of the content of discourse: the
relations and the structure they engender on the discourse determine what’s
available for subsequent anaphoric reference. Asher & Lascarides (2003) thus
include coherence relations as part of a discourse move in dialogue.
Coherence relations include Explanation, Acceptance (expressed by ut-
terances like I agree) and IQAP (Indirect Question Answer Pair), the relation
that holds between Bronston’s response (1d) and the question in (1c) asked
by the prosecutor. An indicative response to a question may be related to
the question in several other ways, in a theory of discourse coherence like
sdrt (Asher & Lascarides 2003). It may be a direct answer, represented with
the relation QAP (Question Answer Pair); or it may imply the respondent
doesn’t know the answer (e.g., I don’t know), represented with the relation NEI
(Not Enough Information). It may deny a presupposition of the question (the
relation Correction) or it may reject the intention underlying the question
(sdrt’s Plan-Correction; e.g., I refuse to answer). It may elaborate a plan to
know an answer while not implying a particular answer (sdrt’s relation Plan-
Elab), or it may provide a Commentary (e.g., That’s an interesting question.).
Different theories of discourse coherence posit different coherence relations,
although all assume the set is finite (Hobbs 1979, Mann & Thompson 1987,
Kehler 2002).
Each coherence relation has its own semantics. For instance, QAP(a, b)
entails that b is a direct answer to the question a according to the composi-
tional semantics of questions and answers. NEI(a, b) entails that b implies
that its speaker doesn’t know an answer to a. IQAP(a, b) entails b defeasibly
implies, via default rules that the questioner and respondent both believe, a
direct answer to the question a. For instance, b may imply a direct answer
via a quantity implicature. Indeed, the only way of making IQAP(1c,1d)
consistent with the compositional semantics of (1c) and (1d) is to assume that
(1d) implies a negative answer via a quantity implicature.5
To assume that a response is always coherently related to a prior turn
is too strong. Had Bronston responded to (1c) with content that lacks any
coherent connection (e.g., I would like some water), there would be no im-
plicated answer and no perjury. Nevertheless, coherence is a key concept in
defining public commitments in discourse: if there’s a possible coherent link
with previous discourse, interpreters will assume that this link is a part of the
speaker’s contribution to the dialogue’s content — he is publicly committed
to it and its consequences.
We need Coherence to analyse misdirections like that in (1). Bronston’s
utterance of (1d) commits him arguably to a negative answer to (1c); for
us, this means that he’s committed to a certain coherence relation holding
between the question in (1c) and his own contribution in (1d), and to the
semantic consequences of that relation.
5 Bronston cannot feasibly base his defence against perjury on a claim that he intended (1d) to
imply a positive answer to (1c) — the semantics of IQAP demand that the answer be inferable
using shared beliefs, and the proposition that employees normally have accounts at their
company’s bank is an unlikely individual belief let alone one that Bronston can argue is
shared.
Asher & Lascarides (2003) provide axioms in what they call a glue logic
(gl) to infer coherence relations that are part of the speaker’s public commit-
ments. The axioms in gl exploit information from lexical and compositional
semantics as well as information about the discourse context, and they li-
cense defeasible inferences to a specific discourse interpretation, including
rhetorical connections. An example gl axiom is (5), where A > B means If A
then normally B:
(5) (λ :?(α,β)∧ qu(α)) > λ : IQAP(α,β)
(5) states that if discourse segment β connects to segment α to form part
of the content of the segment λ, but we don’t know what that connection
is (expressed by the gl formula λ :?(α,β)), and α is a question (expressed
by the gl formula qu(α)), then normally β is an indirect answer.6 Given
an assumption that (1d) attaches to (1c), (5) defeasibly implies that they are
linked by indirect answerhood, an interpretation that intuitively is salient
and natural for (1d) (as the subsequent perjury conviction attests).
The presence of these two features in our model of conversation leads
to two questions. First, what commitment has a speaker made with a partic-
ular contribution and is the commitment one that he can defensibly deny?
And secondly, when do public commitments invite an inference to belief?
Game-theoretic models of human behaviour show that preferences are of
fundamental importance in answering the second question. Whether one
should believe a speaker’s commitments, what game theorists call credibility,
is a function of the degree of overlap among the agents’ preferences; the
less the overlap, the less secure the inference (Crawford & Sobel 1982). We’ll
show in Section 5.2 that alignment of preferences is equivalent to our for-
malisation of Gricean cooperativity. But we don’t explore credibility further
here. Instead, we limit our analysis to the first question. In non-cooperative
situations, identifying commitments is also sometimes problematic and can
be open to debate. While we assume fixed lexical meanings and compositional
semantics, identifying particular coherence relations among utterances is a
matter of defeasible inference (Hobbs et al. 1993, Asher & Lascarides 2003).
Since speakers publicly commit to coherence relations linking their speech
acts to other contributions, computing a speaker’s public commitment is a
product of defeasible inference.
6 Asher & Lascarides (2003) justified the rule by appealing to Gricean cooperative reasoning.
Asher 2012 offers a justification, to which we’ll appeal below, that holds in non-cooperative
or strategic situations.
We are interested in the safety of the inferences about coherence and
about commitments. When is an inference about what a speaker has publicly
committed to a safe inference? When is it safe to assume that a particular
piece of content is a part of the public record? When Gricean cooperativity is
assumed, defeasible inferences about the rhetorical function of an utterance
are safe — they may fail to be sound but only because the speaker or his
interlocutor didn’t pursue a rhetorically clear strategy in language production
or interpretation. But in non-cooperative conversations there may be clear
but unsafe inferences to the rhetorical function of an utterance. Discourse
coherence makes an interpretation of (1d) as an indirect (negative) answer
highly salient. Nevertheless, it is not safe to treat the (defeasibly implied)
negative answer as a part of Bronston’s commitments, for it was deniable.
Bronston could subsequently say with some justification “I never said I didn’t
have a bank account”.7 The notion of safety thus introduces a new distinction
concerning discourse content and implicatures. Safety carves out that part
of discourse content that is undeniably part of the public record.
Inferences based on coherence are sometimes safe, even in non-cooperative
situations. An alternative way of conveying an indirect answer in (1) would
have sustained the perjury conviction, even though the indirect answer fol-
lows from principles of discourse coherence:
(1) d′. Bronston: Only my company had an account, for about six months,
in Zurich.
(1d′) implies a negative answer that goes beyond compositional semantics.
For one thing, it relies on an attachment decision — namely that it attaches
as a response to the question in (1c). In this case, however, answering
yes to a subsequent question yes or no, did you ever have a Swiss bank
account? would intuitively contradict (1d′). Why is this? The meaning of only
is context-sensitive: it presupposes a set of alternatives (e.g., Rooth 1992).
Work on presupposition has established that binding presuppositions is
generally preferred to simple accommodation (van der Sandt 1992) and that
presuppositional binding is a sort of anaphoric binding (Geurts 1996). The
relevant alternatives set for (1d′) is naturally interpreted as bound by a set
7 The Supreme Court in fact over-turned the initial conviction for perjury: it acknowledged
that (1d) was misleading but ruled that the prosecutor should have pursued a follow-up
question, forcing Bronston to commit to the answer no. In effect the Supreme Court ruling
as well as Solan and Tiersma’s (2005) discussion point to the conclusion we establish here
theoretically: it is not always safe to treat implicatures in non-cooperative conversation as
part of the public record.
of discourse available antecedents that includes Bronston; and the binding
of the presupposition to a set including Bronston depends on the inference
that (1c) and (1d′) are coherently connected (for discourse availability is
determined by coherence connections in (1a–cd′) (Hobbs 1979, Kehler 2002,
Asher & Lascarides 2003)). If this coherence connection and the binding are
possible, then the speaker commits to it, thereby committing to (1d′) being
an indirect answer to (1c). Notice, however, that the inference to a negative
answer from (1d′) is still defeasible. The “natural interpretation” relies on
an assumption of coherence and a choice of contextually given alternatives;
these could be wrong, but not plausibly deniable.
We’ve shown that all that’s needed for interpreting (1d′) as an indirect
(negative) answer, besides compositional and lexical semantics, is an assump-
tion that it is coherent. This assumption is needed to resolve the anaphor
only; it forces the value of only to one that makes (1d′) imply that Bronston
didn’t have an account. In contrast, interpreting (1d) as an indirect answer
requires something more, in addition to the assumption that its interpretation
is coherent. It does not follow from assuming that (1d) is coherent that it
implies a negative answer. The compositional and lexical semantic content
associated with (1d) is consistent, for instance, with other coherence rela-
tions. Given (1d)’s fixed meaning — i.e., its compositional semantics plus the
assumption that Bronston’s commitments contain coherence relations — it’s
possible, though at first glance not likely, that Bronston’s commitment is
to Continuation(1b,1d), Continuation being a relation that entails its argu-
ments address a common, contingent topic (e.g., Swiss bank accounts). This
coherence connection does not commit Bronston to an answer to (1c). For
reasons having to do with the maximisation of discourse coherence (Asher &
Lascarides 2003), we choose the attachment point (1c) as the preferred at-
tachment point, and then the defeasible principle (5) does its work, provided
no information in the context blocks the derivation of the indirect answer.
But the fact that intuitively, interpreting (1d) as an indirect answer isn’t safe,
while interpreting (1d′) is, suggests that coherence is a more basic and un-
avoidable commitment than those additional factors involved in interpreting
(1d) as an indirect answer.
Notice that either interpretation of (1d) yields an implicature. The pre-
ferred interpretation of (1d) as an indirect answer gives one; its interpretation
as a Continuation yields the conclusion that (1d) is not an answer to the ques-
tion in (1c), though it is coherent. The puzzle is why is the latter implicature
safe but not the former?
Finally, the contrast between (1d) and (1d′) separates the question of
safety from that of credibility mentioned earlier: the negative answer implied
by (1d′) is safe, but it may very well be incredible — i.e., the negative answer
is a part of the public record, but shouldn’t be believed. Again to underscore
the difference between these concepts, credibility evaluates whether the
speaker’s public commitments can be believed. Safety, on the other hand,
evaluates inferences that identify what the speaker’s public commitments
are. The identification of what is and what must be a matter of public record
is logically prior to that of determining the credibility of those commitments.
We will analyse why inferences about commitments might break down
when preferences aren’t aligned. Following Asher 2012, we provide a game
theoretic explanation that features politeness constraints of why interpreting
(1d) as an indirect answer is natural and rational even in the absence of
strong cooperativity. But it turns out that interpreting (1d) as committing
Bronston to a negative answer is unsafe. Given the stakes, the prosecutor
should have tested the interpretation for safety. This view differs from a
Gricean one, which draws no implicatures in such a strategic situation at all.
For the Gricean, coherence threatens to be abandoned as well: the upshot
is that Bronston’s message is simply noise. In Section 4 we propose a test
for safety of the inference that a normal and salient interpretation (e.g., the
interpretation of (1d) as an indirect answer) is a part of the public record in
the light of other coherent interpretations (e.g., treating (1d) as an ‘opting
out’ move or refusal to answer).
Our model distinguishes three levels of cooperativity: basic cooperativity
at the level of compositional meaning, rhetorical cooperativity and Gricean
cooperativity. This motivates the third feature of our model of conversation,
namely levels of cooperativity. Dialogue (6) (from Chris Potts (pc)) is basic
cooperative but not rhetorically or Gricean cooperative.
(6) a. R(eporter): On a different subject is there a reason that the Senator
won’t say whether or not someone else bought some suits for him?
b. S(heehan): Rachel, the Senator has reported every gift he has ever
received.
c. R: That wasn’t my question, Cullen.
d. S: The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received.
e. S: We are not going to respond to unnamed sources on a blog.
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VySnpLoaUrI)
(6) involves no misdirection; Sheehan simply refuses to engage with the
question and neither implicates an answer nor that he doesn’t know the
answer.
4 Interpretation games
Game theory is a powerful tool for analysing strategic reasoning, in particular
reasoning about communication. It can furnish a rationale for inferring when
a respondent to a question would choose to provide an indirect answer, and
it can also provide the rationale for undermining such an inference, even
though the inference is consistent with the conventional semantics of the
response and even a salient candidate interpretation (e.g., (1d)).
Game theory assumes that all rational agents act so as to maximise their
expected preferences or utilities. We speak of expected preferences so as
to handle the agent’s uncertainty about the environment he’s in; the agent
may be uncertain about the outcome of an action, about other agents’ mental
states or what they might do, or any combination of these. Action choice in
game theory is an optimal tradeoff between the likely outcome of an action
you might choose to perform and the extent to which you want that outcome.
With regard to dialogue, this view makes one’s action choice (what to say for
the speaker, how to interpret what’s said for the interlocutor) dependent on
one’s expectations about the other agent’s motives.
A game consists of a set of players, a set of actions available to each player
and a mapping from each combination of players’ actions to a real valued
payoff or utility for each player. Typically, each player’s payoff depends
on all the players’ actions, not just his own. A Nash Equilibrium (ne) is a
combination of actions that is optimal in that no player would unilaterally
deviate from it — in other words, each player expects at least as good a payoff
from his own specified action than any other action that he could perform,
assuming that all the other players do the actions that are specified for them
in the ne.
Conversations are extensive and dynamic games: players typically per-
form their actions sequentially rather than simultaneously, with one player
performing an action, and then another player performing an action. These
sequential games are represented as trees: the leaf nodes capture each pos-
sible outcome of the game, and they are decorated with the utility of that
outcome for each player (where a utility is a real number reflecting the extent
to which the player prefers that outcome); each non-terminal node is labelled
with the player whose turn it is to act; and each arc is labelled with the
action that the player whose turn it is performs. A sample sequential game
tree is given in (7). Player 1 either asks a question or doesn’t. If player 1
asks a question, then player 2 either responds with an indirect answer or
responds with something that isn’t an indirect answer; otherwise, player 2
says nothing.
(7) 1
ask don’t ask
2
iqap ¬iqap
(0,0)
(1,1)(0,−1)
The utilities for players 1 and 2 are given as pairs of integers. As is often the
case in game theory, we assume that the game tree is common knowledge. In
standard sequential games, players also know what actions the prior players
performed during execution of the game.
Nash equilibria for simple games with perfect information, such as the
one in (7), can be calculated using a procedure known as backwards induction:
this identifies the subtree whose paths specify all and only those combination
of actions that are ne. Roughly put, backwards induction proceeds as follows.
Start at the leaf nodes. The preterminal nodes will be for player n, the last
player in the game. If n is rational, she will choose an action that maximises
her utility, given the state she’s in (i.e., given what the prior players did).
Graphically, this means that if a leaf node l1 shares a mother with another
leaf node l2 with a higher utility for n, then delete that l1 and its arc to the
mother node. Now reason about the actions in this pruned tree of the player
n-1, who plays before n: as before, n-1 chooses the action that will ultimately
maximise her utility after n plays, given what the previous players played.
So one deletes any path from an n-1 node to a leaf node with a lower utility
than some other path that is rooted at that same n-1 node. We continue to
recursively prune branches all the way up the game tree, to yield a subtree of
the original tree that’s rooted at the first player’s move and which consists
of all and only those combination of actions that no one has an incentive to
deviate from — the ne.
In our example (7), backwards induction starts with player 2’s actions.
Given the option of responding to a question, she will respond with iqap
(because her utility for this is 1, compared with the alternative action ¬iqap
with utility −1). So the arc labelled ¬iqap and its leaf with utility (0,−1) is
pruned. If player 1 doesn’t ask anything, then player 2 has no decision to
make. Now player 1 has to decide what to do in the context of this pruned
tree. Asking her question yields her a utility of 1 (for the ¬iqap branch is
pruned); not asking yields her a utility of 0. So the “don’t ask” branch is
pruned. The resulting subtree thus captures just one ne: player 1 asks a
question and player 2 responds with an indirect answer (iqap).
Recall that we are interested in the problem of safe dialogue interpretation:
given the speaker’s signal, which coherent interpretation of it, including
resolved anaphora, is it safe to infer that the speaker is publicly committed
to? So what we represented as a single action in the sequential game (7)
becomes now a sequential game itself: a sequence of two actions where
the speaker S performs some utterance u, and then the interlocutor or
receiver R interprets it — i.e., he identifies the coherent logical form of u that
S publicly committed to. As we showed in Section 3, public commitments
aren’t fully observable to R because they go beyond the compositional and
lexical semantics of S’s utterance. This combination of extensive form and
uncertainty makes a dialogue interpretation game a special type of game
that’s known in the literature as a signalling game. In signalling games, the
receiver does not know the sender’s situation, and in particular what he
intends to convey with a message. Solution concepts that are associated
with signalling games provide the receiver with a rationale for choosing an
optimal action in spite of this uncertainty. Likewise they provide a rationale
for the speaker to choose his optimal signal (or what’s known as his message
in traditional signalling games), based on his estimates of how the receiver
will respond to it.
More formally, a signalling game has a speaker S, a receiver R, a set of
types T and a “dummy” player Nature who assigns a type to S (perhaps
randomly drawn). Based on this type t, S chooses a signal s ∈ S to send to
R. R, on observing s, chooses an action a ∈ A in response. While S knows
his type, R doesn’t. The game ends once R has issued his response action
a. And both players have complete information about their own and the
other player’s relative preferences over the outcomes of the game. These
preferences are represented as a utility function US and UR from T × S ×A
to the real numbers, making their preferences dependent not only on the
actions they perform (i.e., S’s signal s and R’s reaction a), but also on S’s type.
A strategy for a player is a plan dictating the choices he will make in every
situation he might find himself in. A (pure) strategy for the speaker S is thus
a function µ from T to S; for R it is a function α from S to A.
Signalling games as they are traditionally construed assume that T defines
the possible states of affairs. For example, in (3) there will be a state t1 where
no student passed, a state t2 where some but not all students passed, and a
state t3 where all students passed. Given this conception of T , it is natural to
model natural language interpretation using a signalling game where each of
R’s actions in A identifies a subset of T (e.g., van Rooij 2004, Franke 2010): in
other words, a ∈ A identifies R’s take on the state of affairs that S intended
to convey. For instance, if α(3b) = {t2}, then this interpretation includes the
scalar implicature.
What we need as specified in Section 3 is a game where R identifies
S’s public commitments, with speakers committing to specific and coherent
contents. So while the speaker strategies are functions µ from T to S as in
standard signalling games, we take the signals s ∈ S to have a particular
linguistic form. The preferences US and UR are, as before, made dependent
on the speaker type and both players’ actions: they are a function from
T × S × A to R. Here we specify R’s actions to involve the choice of a
meaning representation that resolves s’s linguistic ambiguities, anaphora
and coherence relations to specific values. We call these messages and call
the set of messages M . R’s strategies are thus functions from signals in S to
messages in M : on observing s, R chooses a message m ∈ M . The messages
in M and the signals in S both have exogenous interpretations: .L is the
semantic interpretation of signals given by the compositional and lexical
semantics of the language (its value is a set of possible worlds); and .M is
an assignment of possible worlds to elements of M . For any s ∈ S and for any
α of R, sL ⊇ α(s)M . That is, the interpretation α(s)M of the message
α(s) is always at least as specific as the abstract and underspecified meaning
sL that’s assigned to s by the linguistic grammar. Or to put it another
way, the range of actions available to R all abide by basic cooperativity, with
the message α(s) that R infers being consistent with the compositional and
lexical semantics of the signal s that S performed.
We also need to refine the conception of speaker types T for the appli-
cation we have in mind. We distinguish the types in T from possible states
of affairs, and a fortiori from the interpretation of messages or signals. S
may choose to misdirect R about the message he sent, about what public
commitments he made.8 R thus needs to reason about whether S is likely to
misdirect, or not. Thus, R hypothesises several different preferential profiles
8 This is similar to the bluffing in classic conceptions of bargaining games (Osborne & Rubin-
stein 1990).
for S — these are the t ∈ T — over which he has a probability distribution.
Each t ∈ T conveys information about S and his linguistic strategies — e.g.,
whether or not he is prepared to misdirect when cross examined in court,
whether or not he is the sort of person who is courteous and polite when he
communicates, and so on. R’s task, then, is to reason about the likely type of
S, given what he observes (i.e., the signal s). His task in assessing the safety
of his interpretation is to rigorously test his inference about what message
m S declared by uttering s. A message m is safe if it satisfies such tests.
Let’s look at our example (1) from this perspective, and discuss how to
apply concept solutions for signalling games to inferences about safety.
Figure 1 represents the prosecutor P ’s model of an interpretation game where
Bronston (B) emits a signal s in response to P ’s question (1c), and P infers
what message m B publicly committed to be uttering s. P assigns each
outcome a utility for each player (shown in the order (P, B)). We assume that
P thinks B is guilty — otherwise he wouldn’t be prosecuting him. But P is
uncertain about B’s specific preferences in this game. Hence we postulate
two player types each with their own utility function, where roughly speaking
B1 likes to misdirect P and B2 doesn’t (we’ll shortly see that the utilities
for B1 and B2 reflect this); so P ’s uncertainty about whether B wants to
misdirect him is modelled via the probability distribution Pr(~B) over the
random variable ~B = {B1, B2}. As we said earlier, this probability distribution
Pr over B’s type reflects P ’s model of B’s beliefs and it reflects a general
model of human behaviour, capturing some generic assumptions about
how speakers would behave in various circumstances. In particular, Pr is
conditioned on general evidence about the extent to which humans like to
misdirect their interlocutors in courtroom cross examination. We don’t know
what that theory of human behaviour might be, and so we simply make
Pr(~B) = 〈p, (1− p)〉.
In Figure 1 P doesn’t consider the possibility that B entertained any signal
other than s1 or s2 — s1 being the utterance (1d) that’s actually performed and
that apparently implicates a negative answer, and s2 expressing a refusal to
answer (e.g., I refuse to answer). The actions available to P , given the signals
s1 and s2 and the semantics conveyed by their linguistic convention, are to
interpret B’s signal as an indirect answer (iqap) or as a refusal to answer,
which we label here as ¬iqap. For instance, if the outcome of this game is
(s1, iqap), then P has inferred that B has made a negative answer to (1c) a
matter of public record (because B is publicly committed to that answer). If
the outcome is (s1,¬iqap), then no answer is on the record.
nature
p (1−p)
B1
s1 s2
B2
s1 s2
P
iqap ¬iqap
P
¬iqap
P
iqap ¬iqap
P
¬iqap
(−2,1) (0,−1) (0,−2) (2,−1) (0,−1) (0,−1)
Figure 1 P ’s model of the game where B responds to (1c) and P interprets
that response. B1 is a type of Bronston that likes to misdirect P ,
while B2 prefers not to misdirect P . The utilities are in the order
(P, B).
P ’s and B’s utilities on the outcomes depend on B’s type and on what both
P and B do. The particular numbers and even their ratios could have been
another way but only up to a point, since their tradeoff against the probability
distribution Pr determines the choices the players will make. But certainly
their qualitative ordering matters, and it reflects the following intuitions
about P ’s and B’s preferences among the various possible outcomes of the
game. First, the optimal outcome for P is that B is of type B2 (the version
of B that doesn’t want to misdirect) and they perform (s1, iqap): this puts
an answer on the public record without B misdirecting him, as P intended
B to do (an intention he tries to fulfil by asking the question (1c)). However,
the utilities for the outcomes for B2, given that this is P ’s model of the game
and P strongly believes B to be guilty (regardless of whether he is of type
B1 or B2), are commensurate with the inevitable risk that B2 must take. If
the outcome is (s1, iqap), then he will have enhanced his trustworthiness in
the eyes of the jury by providing an answer (we will discuss this issue of
trust in more detail shortly), but he will also have made himself vulnerable to
a perjury conviction (since this outcome puts a false answer on the public
record). If the outcome is (s2,¬iqap), then he isn’t vulnerable to perjury, but
he does undermine trust. Since both these outcomes have good points and
bad points for B2, we assign them both the same, slightly negative utility
for him. On the other hand, B1 is penalised more than B2 in the outcome
(s2,¬iqap), because not only has B1 (like B2) undermined trust in issuing a
non-answer, but B1 also wants to misdirect P and this outcome means he
failed to do so.
B is also penalised, whatever his type, when P treats an implicature as
unsafe (i.e., the outcome is (s1,¬iqap)): B1 is penalised because he wants to
misdirect P and failed to do so; and B2 is penalised because he does not want
to misdirect P and he inadvertently did! Note that P treating the implicature
as unsafe does not reveal B to be dishonest and the relatively minor penalty
for B1 reflects this — this is a game where P is simply computing the message,
rather than inferring whether the speaker believes that message. We do not
consider cases where s2 is interpreted as iqap, since this interpretation of
s2 violates basic cooperativity.
9 Finally, B1 prefers P to interpret s1 as an
indirect answer: this outcome entails that his preference to misdirect P has
been achieved. But P is penalised in this outcome, since he has miscalculated
what B committed to (given that B is of type B1, the version of Bronston that
is misdirecting).
As we’ve argued intuitively, calculating the optimal strategies depends
not only on the utility of the individual outcomes but also on the value
of p: P ’s belief of how likely it is that B wants to misdirect him. This
probability distribution reflects a different kind of information and a facet of
language and linguistic usage that is not directly related to truth conditional
content. Following Brown & Levinson (1978), Asher & Quinley (2011) argue
that language does not have the role merely to convey or ask for propositional
content. Language also affects relationships between speakers and hearers,
in particular their reputation and a respect for the autonomy or “distance” of
a conversational agent from his interlocutors — his freedom from constraints
imposed by them on his possible actions. They show how to model such
politeness considerations in a game theoretic framework using the notion
of a trust game model (McCabe, Rigdon & Smith 2003). Asher (2012) argues
that by adapting Asher and Quinley’s trust game model to the situation
of questions and their answers, the strategy where a player responds to
a question by committing to an indirect answer is in general a preferred
strategy, especially in situations where the question-response game may
be repeated, as is the case here in our courtroom scenario. Answering a
question shows that one takes the interlocutor’s question seriously, thus
9 Arguably, a general model of human behaviour supports a (defeasible) inference from B
saying I refuse to answer to B believing a positive answer (in other words, B believes the
answer potentially incriminates him and so he gains from not committing to that answer in
the trial). But this inferred belief is not a part of the message — there’s no public commitment
to that belief because it is not a part of the semantic interpretation of the coherence relation
Rejection that B commits to.
adding to his positive face; and giving more information, even if not directly
relevant, increases that positive face. A move that adds to the positive face
of the interlocutor also looks good in the eyes of the judge and the jury (Sally
(2001) and Mazar & Ariely (2006) echo similar themes by speaking of empathy
with the prosecutor or a penchant to stay within social norms). Given these
considerations, we will take it to be reasonable for P and for witnesses to the
conversation to conclude that B is more likely to be of type B2 — an agent
who prefers not to misdirect the prosecutor (or, more quantitatively, we make
p < 0.5).
With these assumptions about the value of p in place, we can test which
combination of strategies in Figure 1 are equilibria. The (pure) equilibria
are those combination of pure strategies 〈µ∗, α∗〉 that maximise both S’s
and R’s expected utilities, the term “expected” factoring in their respective
expectations about what the other player will do (recall that µ∗ is a function
from types T to signals S, and α∗ is a function from signals S to messages
M). For S, this means that he won’t deviate from µ∗, assuming that R is
playing α∗, so long as µ∗ satisfies the equation (8) for all t ∈ T : i.e., the
expected utility of the signal µ∗(t) is at least as good as any other signal s
that he could send in that state, assuming that R is playing by the strategy
α∗.
(8) US(t, µ
∗(t),α∗(µ∗(t))) = arg maxs US(t, s,α
∗(s))
Calculating the expected payoff for R of their combined (pure) strategies
〈µ∗, α∗〉 is more complicated, because S’s speaker type is hidden to R. As
we said before, the expected utility of a message m is the average utility of
each possible outcome of that message, weighted by the probability that the
outcome is achieved. R’s actual utility of a particular outcome is dependent
on (t, s,m), but R is uncertain about the value of t. Thus, as is traditional
in Bayesian models of reasoning with uncertainty, we marginalise out the
value of t, given the observed evidence — namely, that S performed s. So the
expected utility of the message m that R chooses, given that speaker S said
s, is: ∑
t′∈T
Pr(t′|s)UR(t
′, s,m)
In words, it is the weighted average of the utility of each possible outcome
of R’s performing m, given that S performed s, with the weight being R’s
(probabilistic) posterior belief about S’s type, given that R observed S perform
s. Pr(t|s) is defined in terms of S’s strategy µ∗: by Bayes Rule, Pr(t|s) is
Pr(s|t)Pr(t) (up to a normalising factor); and since we are considering only
pure strategies, Pr(s|t) = 1 if µ∗(t) = s and it’s 0 otherwise. So the strategy
(µ∗, α∗) is optimal for R only if it satisfies equation (9):
(9)
∑
t′∈T s.t. µ∗(t′)=s Pr(t
′)UR(t
′, s, α∗(s)) =
arg maxm
∑
t′∈T s.t. µ∗(t′)=s Pr(t
′)UR(t
′, s,m)
Overall, then, (µ∗, α∗) is a (pure) ne only if both equations (8) and (9) are
satisfied.10
With these definitions, we can calculate the expected utilities (EU ) of P ’s
responses to B’s signal. If α(s1) = iqap, then EU(α(s1)) = −2p + 2(1− p) =
2−4p. If α(s1) = ¬iqap, then EU(α(s1)) = 0. So given our assumptions about
the value of p— that is, we have argued that considerations surrounding
trust and politeness make (1− p)≫ p—P ’s optimal response to s1 is iqap
(in other words, he will assume that s1 makes a negative answer a matter of
public record). Clearly, P ’s only response to s2 is ¬iqap.
Given this, Bronston’s optimal tactic if he is of type B1 (that is, someone
who wants to misdirect) is to utter s1: according to (8) this has an expected
utility of 2, compared with his alternative s2 that yields a utility of 0. If
µ(B2) = s1, then EU(µ(B2)) = −1, and if µ(B2) = s2, then again EU(µ(B2)) =
−1 (for recall P ’s optimal responses that we just calculated; α∗(s1) = iqap
and α∗(s2) = ¬iqap). So there are two optimal strategies for B2, given P ’s
optimal strategies: either s1 or s2. Overall, then, we get two (pure) nes. In
both of them, P responds to s1 with iqap and responds to s2 with ¬iqap
and B1 says s1. But in the first one, B2 says s1, and in the second B2 says s2.
So note that this game’s equilibria do not (necessarily) reveal B’s type if he
issues s1.
Let’s reconsider the defeasible inference from (1d) to an answer to (1c). It
is based on the assumption of coherence and that Bronston is reacting to the
prosecutor’s question, which is not plausibly deniable here. We’ve shown
that P ’s conclusion that B committed to a negative answer is reasonable on
game theoretic grounds, using the interpretation game in Figure 1. The game’s
probability distributions over speaker type and utilities are constrained by
factors like negative vs. positive face. But these, we’ve argued, are also
rational. The fact that in the actual dialogue P never did ask the follow
10 This concept solution helps R to decide how to react to S’s signal s only if s is not a complete
surprise, in that s is in the range of at least one ne strategy µ∗. But we’ll ignore situations
where S says something completely unexpected; it’s not relevant to analysing the type of
misdirection we observed in dialogue (1).
up question and moreover attempted subsequently to convict B of perjury
suggests that P took the equilibrium move to be as we just described (and in
particular, that his optimal way of interpreting (1d) was that it made an answer
a matter of public record); so P had a model of B where Pr(B2) ≫ Pr(B1).
On the basis of social factors, we’ve argued that it is reasonable to have a
probability distribution over B’s type that satisfies this property.
Nevertheless, though rational, P has arguably made a mistake. P is correct
to use the small game to test for the coherence of the response. But given
the stakes, he needs to test whether the implicature he has drawn from this
small game is plausibly deniable by B. P failed to do the latter adequately, in
that he should have — and has failed to — consider signals that could have
been but weren’t sent and that are intuitively highly relevant. In particular,
P overlooked the possibility that B considered uttering a direct answer but
chose not to on the grounds that it was suboptimal for him in some way. Note
that in the small game of Figure 1, neither P nor B consider direct answers at
all. P ’s model of the game as it’s given in Figure 1 is thus too small, if it aims
to isolate those commitments that cannot be defensibly denied, which any
adequate test for safety must do. It provides a coherent interpretation and a
rational basis for inferring an indirect answer, but it doesn’t show that that
implicature cannot plausibly be denied. To do the latter, one has to consider
signals that monotonically entail an answer as opposed to implicating it (as
indirect answers do). As Parikh (2001) has argued for other applications, it is
at least possible that B considered such a signal and chose not to use it.
In general, any interpreter must isolate a relevant set of signals to consider
as part of the game. There are an unbounded number of possible signals
that the grammar of the language allows, and there are even an unbounded
number of coherent signals in context. The problem of reasoning about
interpretation is to choose a set of signals (and their attendant possible
messages) that is small enough to effectively perform inference over, but large
enough to include all relevant information that might affect inferences about
interpretation. The signals of Figure 1 yield an understandable and reasonable
result; but it’s not one that yields an interpretation that is necessarily part of
Bronston’s public commitments. To assure the latter, P should have modelled
B’s and his own decisions using a larger game: specifically, one that includes
B’s utilities for performing a signal s3 that monotonically entails a negative
(or positive) answer to the question (1c). Adding this novel signal expands
the range of rhetorical roles that P should consider B is publicly committing
to as well. This is because of the constraints on content that the linguistic
conventions of this expanded signal set impose: P must consider not just
iqap (indirect answerhood) but also qap (direct answerhood). Indeed, given
that s3 monotonically entails qap, the only action available to R if S performs
s3 is qap — any other action would not be a coherent interpretation that
abides by basic cooperativity.
More generally to evaluate a misdirection, one must ensure that the
equilibrium interpretation survives in a game of sufficient size, as measured
by the range of signals that are considered to be a part of the game. This
makes our test loosely related to Farrell’s (1993) strategy for testing equilibria:
that is, ensure what you think is equilibrium play remains so in a big enough
game. But since we’re modelling safety and not credibility, our conditions on
the game being big enough are quite different from Farrell’s.11 Specifically, for
a game to be large enough to test reliably for safety, it must include signals
that monotonically entail the equilibrium public commitment (or message m)
that is being tested. Our model makes one crucial assumption concerning
expressibility: for any equilibrium play (µ,α) that’s being tested, where the
linguistic form of the observed signal s does not monotonically imply φ (and
so it follows that there is at least one speaker type t ∈ T such that µ(t) = s),
but α(s) = m does entail φ, there is some signal s′ whose linguistic form
does monotonically entail the content φ. Our claim here, then, is that a game
yields a safe inference that the speaker publicly commits to the message m
and its implicature φ with the signal s in the situation above only if (µ,α) is
optimal and the game also contains such signals s′.
Including such signals s′ in the game is not only necessary, but sufficient
as well. And this means that we can test safety in finite, bounded games,
making safe inferences about public commitment computable. To see why
including s′ suffices, consider the possible preferences in such an extended
game. If a speaker (type) who intends to publicly commit to φ would prefer
the latter signal s′ over the original one s, then the original equilibrium (µ,α)
won’t survive in the game in which the signal s′ is taken into consideration.
So the speaker’s commitment to the implicature φ isn’t safe. If, on the other
hand, the original equilibrium signal s is at least as preferred by all speaker
types as the signal s′ that monotonically entails φ, then this indicates that it
11 For instance, Farrell needs to assume that talk is cheap and there is always a neologism — that
is, a signal that wasn’t a part of the original game — that expresses X for any subset X of
all possible speaker types T . Given our different goals (i.e., to model safety) we can remain
agnostic about whether talk is cheap because we don’t need to express arbitrary subsets of
possible speaker types.
is rational to realise the intention to convey φ as an implicature rather than
as an entailment. There is no need to compare the equilibrium interpretation
α(s) =m that implicates φ to any other novel signal: either the novel signal
has no interpretation that is consistent with any possible interpretation
of the observed signal s, in which case any rational agent who prefers the
latter signal s′ would never have uttered his actual signal s at all; or the
novel signal s′ entails content ψ that’s distinct from φ but is an alternative
candidate implicature of the speaker’s actual signal s, in which case it will
be an appropriate signal for testing the safety of another equilibrium in the
game. So in sum, we test the safety of an equilibrium interpretation of the
speaker’s message by extending the game (if it is not already so extended) to
include a signal that monotonically entails the equilibrium interpretation.
With this in mind, we extend P ’s model of the game in Figure 1 to include
a signal s3 that monotonically entails a negative answer to his question (1c);
e.g., s3 could be the word no.
12 As we said earlier, we must likewise extend P ’s
possible responses to include qap because of the conventional semantics of
the new signal s3. The extended game is shown in Figure 2. The utilities on the
old outcomes are preserved in this extension. Since B1 would like to misdirect
P , s3 for him is a costly move: the answer is monotonically entailed by s3
and so attempting to misdirect with this signal defies basic cooperativity. In
contrast, B2 prefers that P accurately infer B’s public commitments, and so
for B2 the outcomes (s1, iqap) and (s3,qap) are equally good.
Whether the optimal strategy has shifted for B, however, will depend on
P ’s optimal reactions to B’s moves in this extended game. So let’s examine
these now. P can respond to s1 with either iqap or ¬iqap. As before, which of
these is optimal depends on whether p′ > 0.5 (for P is comparing expected
utilities 2− 4p′ and 0 respectively). Whether P ’s optimal response to s1 has
shifted or not depends on the probability distributions Pr and Pr′ over B’s
type in the original game and its extension. Thus safety tests for interpreting
s1 as an indirect answer depends on these probability distributions too.
Given the purpose of extending the game — to test for safety —P should
preserve as much as possible his model of B’s type in the extended game.
For instance, P should not change his model of B’s (private) beliefs about
the dialogue context. More technically, then, we must ensure that whatever
12 In contrast to Parikh’s (2001) assumptions about ambiguous vs. unambiguous utterances,
inferring that no is a direct answer is no more complex in gl than inferring that s1 is an
indirect answer, and so we do not penalise direct answers on the basis of their complexity in
interpretation as Parikh would have to.
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Figure 2 P ’s model of the extended signalling game where B responds to
P’s question (1c) and P interprets that response. B1 is a type of
Bronston that likes to misdirect P , while B2 would prefer not to
misdirect P . The utilities are given in the order (P, B).
P ’s original likelihood estimates Pr were of what type of person B is (what
B believes, whether or not B would like to misdirect him etc), the extended
model P should use a model of B that updates this original model Pr of
B with the fact (or observed evidence) that B chose not to perform the
signal s3 — in mathematical terms, Pr(~B|¬s3) = Pr
′(~B). If the extended game
were to adopt a probabilistic model of B that deviates from this Bayesian
update, then rather than testing the safety of the original inference for
what’s communicated, one would be providing a distinct rationale entirely
for inferring what’s communicated, based in essence on a completely different
model of the speaker, which itself would need to undergo safety tests. Thus
testing whether an interpretation of a signal is safe uses extensions that are
restricted both in the type of novel moves to be considered (i.e., the only
extensions that matter are ones where the novel signal monotonically entails
the candidate interpretation) and the probability distribution over speaker
types (so that P preserves his probabilistic model of B). These constraints
are captured formally in Definition 2 below, but first we investigate its
consequences to our particular example in Figure 2.
We argued earlier that politeness considerations and games of trust
justify having a relatively low ‘prior’ Pr(B1) = p; that is, in the absence of
any observed evidence, P believes Bronston is unlikely to be an agent who
wants to misdirect. But P ’s probabilistic model Pr of B should also entail
that an agent who wants to misdirect would virtually never choose to utter a
direct answer — such a move is not a misdirection! On the other hand, P ’s
model of B should capture the intuition that were Bronston of type B2 and
intent on putting an answer on public record, then achieving it by uttering s3
is guaranteed to achieve the desired result given the payoffs while uttering
s1 doesn’t guarantee it (it depends on whether the interlocutor takes the
implicature to be safe). These intuitions about P ’s model of misdirecting vs.
non-misdirecting agents is captured in P ’s model of B if we make Pr(B1|¬s3)
greater than Pr(B2|¬s3): i.e., p
′ > 0.5, in contrast to p < 0.5. In other words,
while in the absence of any evidence it seems reasonable on the basis of
considerations about politeness and trust for P to think B is unlikely to want
to misdirect him, the observed evidence —B chose not to supply a direct
answer — will increase his likelihood estimate that B’s intent is misdirection.
These different prior and posterior beliefs that come into play in the
small game and its extension shift the equilibrium. P ’s optimal strategy
α∗ is now one where α∗(s1) = ¬iqap (this has expected utility 0, compared
with the alternative response iqap, which now has expected utility < 0).
α∗(s2) = ¬iqap as before, and α(s3) = qap, regardless of the value of p
′.
Because P ’s optimal strategy shifts, so does Bronston’s. The optimal strategy
for B1 is still s1 (matching the intuitions about the choices that misdirecting
agents would make that we just discussed). For note that given P ’s optimal
interpretations α∗ in this extended game, the expected utility of µ(B1) is −1
if µ(B1) = s1 (i.e., UB(B1, s1,¬iqap)); it is −2 if µ(B1) = s2 and −3 if µ(B1) = s3.
The optimal strategy for B2, on the other hand, has shifted: s1, s2 and s3
are equally optimal for him, all of them having an expected utility of −1.
Thus the safety test on P ’s interpretation of s1 that we have just performed
by extending the game fails: his optimal strategy α∗ in the extension is to
interpret s1 as ¬iqap. And B issuing s1 doesn’t reveal his type in the extended
game (because s1 is optimal for both types).
We regiment these ideas as follows. Definition 1 defines the type of games
that a receiver R constructs when interpreting a speaker S’s signal (so in
Figure 1, T = {B1, B2}, S = {s1, s2}, and M = {iqap,¬iqap}).
Definition 1 Interpretation Games
A receiver R’s model of interpretation is a game 〈S,R, T ,Pr, S,M,U〉
where:
• S is a speaker; R is the receiver;
• T is a set of speaker types;
• Pr(~T) is a probability distribution over T ;
• S is a set of signals that S can emit; so a (pure) strategy
for S is a function µ : T → S;
• M is a set of messages or coherent interpretations that R
can infer; so a (pure) strategy for R is a function α : S →
M ; moreover, for any signal s ∈ S there is at least one
message m ∈ M that is a coherent interpretation of s that
is consistent with the compositional and lexical semantics
for s.
• U = {US, UR} are utility functions from T × S ×M to R.
The set of extended games that we use to test safety are then formalised
as follows:
Definition 2 Game Extension
Let G = 〈S,R, T ,Pr, S,M,U〉 be an interpretation game. Then
G′ = 〈S,R, T ′,Pr′, S′,M ′, U ′〉 is a permissible extension of G,
written G′ ✄G, iff:
i. T = T ′;
ii. S ⊆ S′ and M ⊆ M ′;
iii. U ⊆ U ′; that is, for any (t, s,m) ∈ T ×S×M , U ′a(t, s,m) =
Ua(t, s,m) for a ∈ {S,R}.
iv. Pr′ is a Bayesian update of Pr, given the unconsidered
signals in S′ \ S. I.e.:
Pr′(~T) = Pr(~T | ∧sk∈S′\S ¬sk)
In words, G′ is a permissible extension of G if it consists of the same players
(and player types), it has strictly more strategies, the utility functions in G′
extend those in G, and the probability distribution Pr′ is a Bayesian update
of the probability function of the original game, given that the moves in S′
that were unconsidered originally didn’t actually happen.
We can now define when an inference about public commitment is safe.
Note that Definition 3 conditions the test for safety on the game being of
sufficient size.
Definition 3 Safe Public Commitment
A receiver R’s interpretation m of a signal s is a safe represen-
tation of a speaker S’s public commitment in a game G if and
only if in any permissible extension G′ of G that includes at
least one signal s′ that monotonically entails m, α∗(s) = m
remains an optimal strategy for R in the extended game G′,
according to the equilibria strategies defined by equations (8)
and (9).
When applied to (1), the inference to IQAP(c, d) derived from sdrt’s glue
logic is shown to be unsafe. While it is an optimal interpretation in the small
game, it is not in the extended game. The small game is the right one for
evaluating how B intended his signal to be interpreted and how it should be
interpreted even in a strategic setting, but it’s the wrong one for evaluating
whether that interpretation passes the test of plausible deniability. Our
model thus implies: (i) the implicature exists and can be rationally drawn
in strategic situations, but it is not an unavoidable public commitment of
Bronston’s, as the prosecutor assumed; (ii) to be safe, the prosecutor should
have said something akin to the reporter in (6c). That is, a rational agent
would have pursued his goal to get the information about the bank account
on the public record with a follow-up, direct question.13
5 Cognitive modelling: a symbolic approach
The model in Section 4 leaves room for improvement. It’s disconnected
from the glue logic (gl); we need to understand how safety interacts with
inferences about discourse structure. It’s also mute as to the exact nature of
the mistake in P ’s reasoning. Definition 3 stipulates that P should consider
a signal s3 that monotonically entails an answer, and so his probability
distribution over player types should take such information into account.
But it doesn’t tell us what led P to his mistake in the first place, or how
to correct it. What’s missing is the reasoning that should take us from the
smaller game to its extension. The model in Section 4 reflects only the result
of reasoning in equilibrium. But intuitively, there is a dynamic transition
between one model of Bronston’s preferences (as he intends to convey them)
and another (the better one) that comes from observing evidence and from
the reasoning that takes this new evidence into account. This can’t be defined
in the framework of the previous section. It can only give the equilibrium
strategies in the small game and the bigger one. It doesn’t account for the
13 This provides a theoretical reconstruction of the final conclusions by Solan & Tiersma (2005)
concerning the Bronston case.
transition from one game to the other, and it is this transition that gives the
concept of safety its bite.
To address this gap, we will integrate elements of the model of Section 4
with a logical framework consonant with gl, thus providing an alternative
model of strategic conversation. The games in Figures 1 and 2 provide the
model theory for linking speaker types to public commitments; what we
need in addition is a proof theory in which the reasoning can be explored,
in particular the reasoning as to why an agent should consider the larger
game rather than the smaller one. So we will start with a partial theory or
description of an agent’s mental state, which then gets updated and revised
as one learns more about the agent or as one considers options that didn’t
seem relevant before a particular piece of evidence came to light. Whether
the sentences in this theory are assigned probabilities is not terribly relevant.
But what is important is that elements of this theory get revised in the light
of new evidence, as Alchourrón, Gärdenfors & Makinson (1985) suggest. This
can either be done by conditionalising a probability distribution over new
evidence like the unconsidered move s3, or, more symbolically, via a theory
that incorporates general but defeasible principles about human action and
the preferences that underlie them.
To reason about an agent’s motives and actions (including discourse ac-
tions), we use a symbolic approach and familiar modal operators to express
an agent’s mental state that integrate easily with our language of nonmono-
tonic entailment (recall that A > B means If A then normally B). We call this
language and the axioms developed therein cl (cognitive logic). cl as it’s
developed in Asher & Lascarides 2003 contains modal operators Ba and Ia:
Baφ means agent a believes φ, and Iaφ means agent a intends to bring
about a state that entails φ. The link between qualitative belief statements
Baφ and the probabilistic beliefs as expressed in the games of Section 4
follow straightforwardly, using standard methods for linking quantitative
and qualitative belief models (e.g., Pearl (1988)). Finally, our distinction be-
tween (private) belief and public commitment leads us to add to cl a modal
operator Pa,D: the formula Pa,Dφ states that agent a publicly commits to φ
with regard to the group of agents D.
5.1 Reasoning with partial information about preferences
Our cognitive logic cl needs a way to express and reason about preferences.
For this we draw on CP-nets (Boutilier et al. 2004, Domshlak 2002), the formal
details of which are in the Appendix. We use CP-nets because they offer a
compact and qualitative way of talking about preferences.
The basic ingredient is a conditional preference: “if c is true, then I prefer
p to q”. In our signalling games, the agents have preferences about the
values of a signal S (we might take its values to be, say, s1, s2 or s3) and
preferences about the values of the messages M (e.g., iqap, qap and ¬iqap).
An example preference formula is (10), which means: if the signal is s1, then
agent a prefers the message to be iqap (i.e., he prefers that the speaker be
committed to an indirect answer) rather than ¬iqap or qap, between which
he is indifferent.
(10) s1 : iqap ≻a ¬iqap ∼a qap
This particular conditional preference statement makes a’s preferences over
the values for M dependent on those of S. An example formula with no such
dependencies is the global preference statement iqap ≻a ¬iqap, which says
that a unconditionally prefers the message iqap to ¬iqap.
Given that we work with finite games (see Section 4), our signals S and
messages M always have a finite number of values in any interpretation game.
We can treat these values s1, s2, . . . , iqap, . . . as propositional variables in our
cl, so long as we also include appropriate background axioms: for instance
si∧ (si → ¬(sj∨sk)), for i, j, k ∈ {1,2,3} and i ≠ j ≠ k (in words, exactly one
signal is emitted). One would need an equivalent set of background axioms
for the messages too. Thus it is easy to extend the cl language to express
formulae like (10). Note also that an agent may control some of the variables
over which he has preferences, and not control others. For those that he
controls, one can conceive of the variable as an action: it is something that
the agent can choose to make true, or not.
As an example, suppose a customer C calls a box office clerk O to book
tickets to the opera:
(11) a. C : Do you have two tickets to the opera in the dress circle?
b. O: I can give you two tickets together in the stalls.
O’s task in this interpretation game is to respond to C ’s question (11a) with a
signal (here it’s (11b)) and then C ’s task is to compute what content the signal
publicly commits O to.
On the basis of the arguments for safe inference given in Section 4, we
will assume that the game consists of three possible signals and the coherent
interpretations that are consistent with their conventional semantics. The
first one s1 is the signal that O actually performed (i.e., (11b)), which is
consistent with the coherent interpretation iqap (indirect answerhood) and
¬iqap (a refusal to answer) but not qap (direct answerhood). (11b), like (1d),
defeasibly implies a negative answer via shared knowledge (e.g., that the
stalls is not a part of the dress circle) on the basis of scalar implicatures.
As in Section 4, then, C should include in his model both a signal s2 that
monotonically entails ¬iqap (e.g., I refuse to answer, or I wonder when my
break is), and a signal s3 that monotonically entails a negative answer (e.g.,
no, and its attendant message qap).14 The conditional preference statements
in (12) then capture intuitively compelling information about C’s and O’s
preferences (recall that O controls the values of the variables s1, s2, s3, and C
controls the values of the variables iqap, qap and ¬iqap):
(12) iqap ≻O qap ≻O ¬iqap
iqap : s1 ≻O s3 ∼O s2
qap : s3 ≻O s1 ∼O s2
¬iqap : s2 ≻O s1 ≻O s3
iqap ≻C qap ≻C ¬iqap
iqap : s1 ≻C s3 ∼C s2
qap : s3 ≻C s1 ∼C s2
¬iqap : s2 ≻C s1 ≻C s3
At the domain level, both C and O want C to buy tickets to the opera. So
both C and O would rather O commit to an answer to C ’s question than not
so commit, and moreover they prefer O to commit to an answer that identifies
tickets to buy over an answer that does not. (12) reflects this with the first
preference statement for each agent. O and C share global preferences
over O’s public commitments; they both want him to declare a negative
answer that also identifies tickets (iqap) over just a direct negative answer
(qap), which is in turn preferred to a refusal to answer (¬iqap). Furthermore,
both C and O abide by basic cooperativity. (12) reflects basic cooperativity,
because the preferred values of signals are dependent on the message and,
for example, if the message is qap, then the preferred signal for both agents
is s3 while they are indifferent between s2 and s1. Interpreting either of the
latter two signals as qap would violate basic cooperativity.
Since the agents O and C control the values of some of the variables in
these preference statements, the statements determine a game. To calculate
an optimal joint outcome, CP-nets validate two ordering principles when
calculating each agent’s relative preferences over all the outcomes of the
game. The primary principle is that violating more preference statements is
14 In Section 5.2 we show that for games such as this one, where the agents’ preferences are
aligned, a smaller game that lacks s3 is big enough to draw safe inferences about public
commitments.
worse than violating fewer of them. The secondary principle is that violating
a (conditional) preference of something on which your other preferences
depend is worse than violating those other preferences. So, for example,
(12) yields s3 ∧ iqap as a preferred outcome over s3 ∧ qap for both O and
C: both of these outcomes violate exactly one preference statement for
each agent (the first violates iqap : s1 ≻ s3 ∼ s2 and the second violates
iqap ≻ qap ≻ ¬iqap); but violating the global preference statement is worse.
In fact, this logic yields for both O and C the same optimal outcome from
(12), namely s1 ∧ iqap. Equilibrium play is defined as before: agents act so as
to achieve an outcome that no agent would unilaterally deviate from, given
the subset of the variables that he controls.
The above principles suffice to decide which outcomes are optimal when
complete information about preferences is available. A nice byproduct of
this approach, however, is that it applies to situations with only partial
information about preferences, action and behaviour. For example, suppose
Bronston (B) wants the prosecutor (P ) to interpret his response to (1c) as an
indirect answer, and he prefers to utter signal s1 (i.e., (1d)) if P would interpret
s1 this way, otherwise he prefers to utter an explicit refusal to answer (signal
s2). In other words, he has the preferences given in (13).
(13)
iqap ≻B ¬iqap
iqap : s1 ≻B s2
¬iqap : s2 ≻B s1
But suppose that B lacks complete knowledge of P ’s preferences: he does not
know if P is a gullible prosecutor, who tends to treat all implicated content as
a matter of public record (even if it’s not safe to do so; i.e., s1 : iqap ≻P ¬iqap)
or whether he is skeptical and so prefers not to interpret the signal s1 as a
commitment to an answer (i.e., s1 : ¬iqap ≻P iqap). If P is gullible, then their
joint preferences would make B’s unique optimal move s1. If P is skeptical,
then preferences would make B’s unique optimal move s2. Consequently,
if B doesn’t know if P is gullible or skeptical, he will have to use factors
that are additional to his partial knowledge of preferences to decide between
performing s1 and s2.
We handle partial information about preferences in cl thanks to two
features. First, cl’s language already expresses partial preferences: any
strict subset of a complete set of preference statements—e.g., any subset
of the statements in (12)—expresses partial information about preferences.
Secondly, we exploit default reasoning (via the weak conditional >) to make
partial information about preferences defeasibly complete, thereby allowing
us to use the above two principles for identifying optimal outcomes to decide
how to act. In other words, a set of preference statements is made complete
by adding assumed preferences that defeasibly follow from default axioms in
cl, with the ‘last resort’ being that agents default to being indifferent among
relevant variables for which preference information is missing entirely. So cl
will include axioms A > B where B is a conditional preference statement and
A expresses information about preferences, public commitment, belief etc.
We’ll see examples of such axioms shortly.
This approach avoids reasoning about a range of player types, each
associated with complete preferences. Instead, when interpreting utterance
(1d), say, agent P will reason with and revise his partial description of B’s
preferences, exploiting the evidence that he said (1d) (see Section 5.2 and 6
for details). Thanks to the nonmonotonic logic of cl’s >, one can support
decisions about what action to perform even if knowledge of preferences is
partial.
Let’s suppose that G is a game: i.e., a conjunction of conditional prefer-
ence statements for its two players with each player controlling the value
of some subset of the variables. cl must link such a game (or preference
statements) G to the agents’ beliefs when choosing their optimal move: since
the optimal outcome for an agent in G can include variables whose values he
doesn’t control, one needs to check that he doesn’t find his optimal state(s)
doxastically improbable (this is a crude way of ensuring that agents act so as
to maximise expected utility rather than acting with wishful thinking about
what’s feasible). We supply a notion of doxastic improbability in cl via its
nonmonotonic consequence relation: i.e., a state is belief compliant if its nega-
tion does not defeasibly follow from the premises and background theory
of cl axioms. So to identify an agent’s optimal belief-compliant state(s), we
filter out from his set of best responses to variables he doesn’t control those
states that are defeasibly inconsistent with his beliefs (this is decidable).
Within cl this leads to the definition of a CP-solutiona(φ,G) for agent a and
game G:
Definition 4 CP-solutiona(φ,G) holds iff:
i. a is a player in the game G; and
ii. s ⊢ φ for every belief-compliant optimal state s of G:
i.e., where Γ includes the cl background axioms and the
relevant premises about players in G, Γ |∼/ Ba¬s and for
any state s′ that is strictly more optimal for a in G than s,
Γ |∼Ba¬s
′.
For example, if B’s preferences are those in (13), and B believes that P ’s pref-
erences satisfy s1 : ¬iqap ≻P iqap, then by Definition 4 CP-solutionB(s2, G)
holds.
5.2 Principles of action and decision making
With this treatment of preferences in cl we can now provide principles that
makes our qualitative and symbolic model approximate the predictions of
standard game theoretic models. The principles we provide make agents
pay-off maximisers (the basic principle of rationality from game theory), basic
cooperative (Clark 1996, Lewis 1969), and defeasibly committed to discourse
coherence (the basic principle of sdrt).
Pay-off maximisers intend actions that are an optimal trade-off between
their preferences and their beliefs about what’s possible; and an agent in-
tending ψ means that in the context of his current beliefs he prefers ψ to
all alternative actions. We capture these two principles with the axioms
Maximising Utility (a) and (b):
• Maximising Utility:
a. (G ∧ CP-solutiona(ψ,G)) > Iaψ
b. (Iaψ∧ player(i,G)) > CP-solutiona(ψ,G)
Maximising Utility part (a) ensures a intends ψ if ψ follows from all
belief-compliant optimal states (by Definition 4). Indeed, agent a’s intentions
are conditional not only on all of a’s beliefs but also all of a’s preferences and
those of any player that affect a’s preferences. The latter property follows
because the weak conditional > validates the Penguin Principle — i.e., default
consequences of rules with more specific antecedents override conflicting
defaults from less specific antecedents. So if a more specific game G′ is
known to hold and it yields conflicting intentions to those resulting from G,
then the intentions from G′ are inferred and those from G aren’t.
Axiom (b) likewise conditions a’s preference for ψ on all his beliefs
(thanks to Definition 4). It yields constraints on G from intentions: if one
knows Iaψ and nothing about G or about a’s beliefs, then the minimal
preference representation G that satisfies the default consequence is simply
the global preference ψ ≻a ¬ψ. As agents converse, each dialogue action may
reveal new information about intentions, and via Maximising Utility part
(b) this imposes new constraints on G. But while Maximise Utility part
(b) is conservative about exactly which of a’s beliefs his preference for ψ is
conditioned on, his commitments, made via dialogue moves, can reveal more
precise information — e.g., the utterance I want to go to the mall to eat should
be sufficient to infer eat : mall ≻i ¬mall. A detailed algorithm for extracting
preferences and dependencies among them from conversation, which exploits
recursion over the conversation’s discourse structure, is detailed in Cadilhac
et al. (2011), but the details of this aren’t relevant for our purposes here.
cl captures basic cooperativity via an intention that one’s public commit-
ments be shared:
• Intent to Share Commitment: (b ∈ D ∧ Pa,Dφ) > Pa,DIaPb,Dφ
If a commits to b (among others) to content φ, then normally a is also
committed to intending that b so commit. This rule captures basic coop-
erativity because b committing to a’s commitments entails he understands
a’s commitments (Clark 1996). Indeed, it captures something much stronger
than basic cooperativity — an intention that your contribution be accepted by
others. While this is stronger than basic cooperativity, we think it’s rational
even in non-cooperative games: why commit to content if you don’t intend
that others accept the commitment? Following Perrault (1990), we refine this
default axiom for assertions: when a commits to an assertion φ to b, then
normally Pa,DIaBbφ (this is also stronger than just basic cooperativity).
Finally, we make agents normally commit to a rhetorical connection to
some prior contribution: in the axiom Coherence, ?R(?,φ) means that the
discourse segment φ to which a commits is connected to some available
prior segment in the discourse context with some coherence relation:
• Coherence: b ∈ D ∧ Pa,Dφ > BbPa,D?R(?,φ)
As with Intent to Share Commitment, this assumption is grounded in a
game theoretic justification based on face considerations: following Asher
& Quinley (2011), Coherence is rational on politeness grounds, because
completely ignoring all prior dialogue is an affront to the interlocutor’s face.
In Section 4, we defined safety as a test involving game extensions. The
arguments from Section 4 that adding a signal s′ that monotonically entails
φ is necessary and sufficient for testing the safety of an inference that a
speaker is committed to φ still apply. But in this symbolic cognitive model,
agents have a single partial theory about preferences, which gets updated
and revised through observation: in particular, as new actions are considered,
preferences over the existing actions may be revised. So adding new actions
in cl doesn’t always create game extensions, and the test for safety in this
symbolic model must therefore be adapted. Specifically, the test for safety
now involves extending a game frame — a game frame being the set of players
and the actions available to each player (in other words, the game frame
abstracts away from the players’ preference profiles that turn a game frame
into a particular game).
Extending a game frame allows inferences in cl to revise preferences
for the original actions, in light of the novel actions in the extension. An
inference that an implicature φ is a part of the speaker’s public commitment
is safe just in case it remains a part of the equilibrium strategy (i.e., in both
agents’ CP-solutions) over the game that is defeasibly inferable from the
game frame that’s extended to include at least one signal s′ that entails φ.
More formally, let S and R be the speaker and receiver in an interpretation
game. Let T be R’s background theory of general human decision making
(e.g., the cl axiom Maximising Utility) together with his particular knowl-
edge of S’s and his own mental states (including, for instance, preference
information extracted from the dialogue context, including the signal that S
has just performed). Then T supports defeasible inferences from the set of
signals and messages S ×M in their interpretation game to a complete set
of preference statements or game G(S ×M)— the ‘last resort’ being to infer
indifference whenever preference information about outcomes in S ×M is
missing entirely. We write this defeasible inference as T + S ×M |∼G(S ×M).
Now suppose that an interpretation φ is optimal in G(S×M)— more formally
CP-solutionR(φ,G(S ×M)). Then φ is a safe interpretation just in case the
entailment in (14) holds, where S′ ×M ′ is S ×M extended with at least one
signal s′ (and attendant messages m′) such that s′ ⊢ φ:
(14) T + (S′ ×M ′) |∼G(S′ ×M ′)∧ CP-solutionR(φ,G(S
′ ×M ′))
This definition of safety emphasises how from the standpoint of the
symbolic model, the game frame extensions are just a more specific non-
monotonic theory, working over a more specific set of premises (in particular,
one that includes additional signals and messages). Safety then amounts
to ensuring that an optimal outcome given a small set of observations and
considered moves can still be calculated as optimal when considering all
the relevant moves — the relevant moves being signals that monotonically
entail the optimal message being tested. This is why safety is rationally
important: in deciding whether a move is optimal, one should take all the
relevant information into account. And it is the (finite) set of coherence
relations — in particular, the subset of coherence relations whose semantic
consequences are consistent with the compositional and lexical semantics of
the observed signal — that specifies the relevant moves in a finite way.
We have now provided all the pieces of our symbolic model, the proof
theoretic counterpart to the more traditional model of Section 4. This permits
us to provide a correspondence between the Gricean Principles of Section 2
and games where preferences align. We first offer the following definition of
Grice Cooperative games:
Definition 5 A game is Grice Cooperative (GC) just in case for
any of its players a and b
i. When a or b perform a particular speech act, then they
normally have the intentions that, according to the glue
logic, are associated with a move of that type — so to make
an assertion is (normally) to have the intention that the
audience believe it; and to ask a question is to (normally)
intend to receive a true and informative answer; and
ii. Bb(φ : ψ ≻a ¬ψ) > (φ : ψ ≻b ¬ψ)
(in other words, the agents believe that their preferences
normally align).
Assuming the axioms of Intent to Share Commitment, Maximising
Utility and Coherence are mutually believed and several other reasonable
axioms about beliefs, intentions and about preferences over beliefs, we can
state and prove within cl Fact 1 and Fact 2, which together provide the
equivalence of our characterisation of GC environments with the axiomatic
approach given in Section 2 (see the Appendix for the proofs).
Fact 1
Sincerity: (Pa,Dφ∧GC) > Baφ
Sincerity for Intentions: (Pa,DIaφ∧GC) > Iaφ
Sincerity for Preferences: (Pa,Dφ : ψ ≻a ¬ψ∧GC) >
φ : ψ ≻a ¬ψ
Competence: (Pa,Dφ∧ Pb,D?φ∧ a,b ∈ D)→
((BbBaφ∧GC) > Bbφ)
Cooperativity: (b ∈ D ∧ Pa,DIaφ∧GC) > Ibφ
Fact 1 states principles of Sincerity and Cooperativity that are usually primi-
tive axioms in Belief Desire Intention (bdi) approaches to dialogue; here, we
prove that they are derivable in cl, given its axioms of rational behaviour,
if the dialogue agents D are players in a game G that satisfies Definition 5.
They make any declared belief, intention or preference in a GC conversation
normally an actual belief, intention or preference too; Competence makes
belief transfer the norm; and Cooperativity makes a declared individual
intention normally a shared actual intention.15
We now relativise our Gricean Principles of Sincerity for factual contents,
intentions and preferences to an arbitrary interpretation game G (i.e., G may
be an uncooperative game). Basically, one simply replaces the formula GC
in the principles in Fact 1 with any game G (thereby forming a default with
a less specific antecedent). For instance, the relevant form of Sincerity in a
game G is (15), and mutatis mutandis for the other Gricean Principles.
(15) (Pa,Dφ∧G) > Baφ
With the Gricean principles so defined, one can prove Fact 2 (the proof is in
the Appendix).
Fact 2
Suppose Sincerity, Sincerity for Intentions and for Preferences,
Competence and Cooperativity hold of an interpretation game
G. Then G is GC .
The Gricean Principles are thus quite strong: by Fact 2, they defeasibly
entail alignment of preferences of the two agents, a fact that Lewis’ (1969)
signalling games assume. Facts 1 and 2 together yield a proof of a folklore
fact:
Fact 3
Lewis-style signalling games that verify Maximising Util-
ity, Intent to Share Commitment and Coherence are a
special case of GC games and entail all the Gricean Principles.
Intention and belief transfer in a GC conversation is a default: even if the
preferences align, conflicting prior beliefs may mean agents have different CP-
solutions making their intentions different too (by Maximising Utility),
and Competence may apply but its consequent isn’t inferred. Thus rejection
15 This generalises and strengthens the result of Asher, Sher & Williams (2001) concerning
Sincerity.
and denial occur in GC dialogues, as exemplified in (16), a GC conversation
on the assumption that A and B share preferences to go to Chop Chop and
may even share a preference to there go by car:
(16) a. A: Let’s go to Chop Chop by car.
b. B: But there’s no parking.
c. A: Then let’s take the bus.
This example also shows that while conversations that are GC (as defined in
Definition 5) and conversations that are rhetorically cooperative must both be
basic coooperative, GC games and rhetorical cooperativity are independent
of one another. (16) is GC according to Definition 5, but it is not rhetorically
cooperative because (16b) implicates that B rejects the intention revealed by
(16a) — to get to Chop Chop by car.
A GC environment yields the more specific cl principles in Fact 1 from
cl’s general axioms. We likewise have a special result with respect to testing
safety in GC conversations. Consider again the GC dialogue (11). Indirect
answers are prevalent as responses to questions: sdrt captures this via its
gl axiom (5), which makes an indirect answer the default response to any
question. So if the compositional semantics of a question α and its response
β is consistent with IQAP(α,β), then that is an equilibrium in a simple game
in which we consider responses broadly, as iqap vs. non-answers, or ¬iqap.
A simple game, including just the two signals s1 (a signal that in gl yields an
inference to iqap) and s2 (a signal that does not yield a gl inference iqap) is
given in (17):
(17) iqap ≻O ¬iqap
iqap : s1 ≻O s2
¬iqap : s2 ≻O s1
iqap ≻C ¬iqap
iqap : s1 ≻C s2
¬iqap : s2 ≻C s1
By the earlier discussion (see equation (14)), testing the safety of this focal
equilibrium involves adding a novel signal s3 that monotonically, rather than
defeasibly, entails the answer (e.g., s3 is no). So one likewise adds qap to the
game too. The result of this is already given in (12). This extension retains
the same CP-solution, namely (s1, iqap). The game in (12) reflects how, in
GC environments, indirect answers may be preferred to direct ones because
of the extra information they provide. Interpreting (11b) as an indirect
answer is safe because relative to the agents’ underlying game problem it is a
preferred response over simply providing the direct answer no: it anticipates
the customer’s CP-solution on learning the direct answer and helps him to
achieve that. More generally, given that in GC environments the defaults
needed to infer scalar and other implicatures are sound, iqap moves, and
indeed all discourse computations of coherence relations and hence equilibria
of our ‘smaller’ interpretation games, are normally safe. Using the principles
in Fact 1, safe interpretations are normally credible too:16
Fact 4
A CP-solution of a GC interpretation game is normally safe
and credible.
Thus, strategic reasoning in a GC environment can be carried out with small
games: their equilibrium results will normally hold in the relevant extensions.
Thus strong cooperativity simplifies strategic thinking.
6 Non cooperative conversations
The GC condition doesn’t hold in the courtroom dialogue (1). So the principles
in Fact 1 and Fact 4 don’t apply, though Maximising Utility, Intent to
Share Commitment and Coherence do.
Interpreting (1d) involves using defeasible inference to construct P ’s
model of B’s and his own preferences over the signals that B contemplates as
responses to (1c), and P ’s interpretation of those signals, with P ’s defeasible
inference about preferences taking observations about B’s chosen action (i.e.,
the signal (1d)) into account. Let’s assume that whatever method one uses
for extracting commitments to preferences from signals yields the intuitive
result from B’s actual signal s1 (or (1d)): i.e., that B prefers iqap (i.e., B prefers
P to interpret him as committed to a negative answer) over ¬iqap — thus
matching the predictions about logical form from the glue logic gl. Then
the definition of safety in cl demands that we reason with a preference
description that includes not only s1 (and iqap) but also a signal s3 that
monotonically entails the negative answer (e.g., no). In other words, we must
work with an extended game frame, so that in testing safety P essentially
compares two games: the set of strategies in one game (consisting of the
actual signal s1) is a subset of the other (consisting of signal s3 too), but the
games may disagree on the preferences over those strategies. That’s because
16 To illustrate this with our example game, O uses the Gricean principles to interpret C’s
response as implicating a negative answer (see Section 2), and by Sincerity and Competence
C believes this answer. This is a simple, symbolic counterpart to the much more elaborate
result in Crawford & Sobel 1982.
the information in the larger game leads one to revise one’s estimates of the
other agents’ preferences.
As in Section 4, we illustrate the comparison with a smaller game con-
taining just the signals s1 (the string (1d)) and s2 (I refuse to answer) and the
messages iqap and ¬iqap. P ’s model of his own and B’s preferences is shown
in (18):
(18) iqap ≻B ¬iqap
iqap : s1 ≻B s2
¬iqap : s2 ≻B s1
s1 : iqap ≻P ¬iqap
s2 : ¬iqap ≻P iqap
iqap : s1 ≻P s2
¬iqap : s1 ∼P s2
As in Figure 1, P would prefer B to commit to an answer (i.e., iqap), but
only if the signal’s conventional semantics is consistent with this commitment
(so his preferences over interpretations are dependent on the signal). Indeed,
if his interpretation is ¬iqap, then he’s indifferent about the signal (see
P ’s utilities in Figure 1). In contrast to the GC games in (12) and (17), P ’s
preferences feature a dependency of the message on the signal and vice versa.
P ’s model of B assumes that B wants P to interpret his signal as an answer:
after all, this is what B would want, whether he wants to misdirect or not.
But P also reasons that if B thinks P is the skeptical prosecutor described
earlier (i.e., a prosecutor who performs ¬iqap), then B will prefer to refuse to
answer (so B’s preferences over signals depend on how P will interpret it).
The logic of preferences described earlier yields from the preference state-
ments in (18) the following (partial) preference orderings over all outcomes
for B and P :
(19) (s1 ∧ iqap) ≻B (s2 ∧ iqap) ≻B (s2 ∧¬iqap) ≻B (s1 ∧¬iqap)
(s1 ∧ iqap) ≻P {(s1 ∧¬iqap), (s2 ∧¬iqap)} ≻P (s2 ∧ iqap)
In this small game, (s1 ∧ iqap) is an optimal solution for both players; it is
irrational for Bronston to choose a signal other than s1 and for the prosecutor
to choose an interpretation of s1 other than iqap.
But this inference isn’t safe. It constitutes a defeasible deduction about
B’s and P ’s preferences given the ‘small’ game frame consisting of signals s1
and s2 — a deduction that is reasonable and normally sound given general
principles of human behaviour as well as particular facts about the situation
at hand. But it ignores potentially highly relevant information. The definition
of safety in cl (see (14)) demands that P compute defeasible inferences about
preferences over a game frame that includes a signal s3 that monotonically
entails the implicated answer that is a part of the equilibrium strategy (s1 ∧
iqap) in the smaller game. The preferences over the game with the extended
strategy set — where s3 is added to S and qap is added to M — is shown in
(20).
(20) iqap ≻B ¬iqap ≻B qap
iqap : s1 ≻B s2 ≻B s3
¬iqap : s2 ≻B s1 ≻B s3
qap : s3 ≻B s1 ∼B s2
s3 ≻P s1 ∼P s2
s3 : qap ≻P iqap ∼P ¬iqap
s1 : ¬iqap ≻P iqap ∼P qap
s2 : ¬iqap ≻P iqap ∼P qap
Observe how the preferences change: the preference s1 : iqap ≻P ¬iqap is
reversed in the larger game. Indeed, P ’s preferences over the signal S are
now global.
These changes occur as a consequence of P ’s (defeasible) reasoning about
preferences over the more specific scenario, which includes s3 as well as s2
and s1. He must, in particular, reason as to why B considered s3 but chose
not to perform it. Intuitively, he concludes (defeasibly) that B believes that
were he to utter a signal s3 whose clear interpretation is qap, he would either
have to lie explicitly thereby risking perjury or to admit to a damaging piece
of evidence. B prefers iqap and even ¬iqap over qap. This counterfactual
reasoning isn’t representable at all in the orthodox model of Section 4, but
it can be represented in our qualitative model cl, which supports generic
reasoning over mental states and human action (though we don’t give specific
formal details of this counterfactual reasoning here). With P ’s different model
of his own and B’s preferences, which are defeasibly inferred for the extended
game frame, P ’s optimal interpretation of B’s move s1 is ¬iqap rather than
iqap. Furthermore, by reasoning about preferences in the extended game
frame P infers why it is rational for B to utter s1: namely, B prefers that
P perform a defeasible but unsafe inference about what B has publicly
committed to (for note that B’s optimal outcome remains (s1, iqap) even in
the bigger game, but that is no longer a CP-solution for P ).
From our proof theoretic perspective then, safety encodes the passage
from a “general” context in which certain reasonable but defeasible inferences
are drawn to a more specific context in which different perhaps incompatible
inferences are drawn. The prosecutor’s mistake in the Bronston trial was
similar to someone who given a default theory with the principles birds
fly, penguins don’t fly and penguins are birds and an observation that B is
a bird concludes that B flies. This inference is unsafe because he should
check first whether B is a penguin! The analogous test with interpretation
games is to check whether it is rational for an agent to exploit implicatures
derivable in the general context to misdirect. If so, then these implicatures
may be deniable; i.e., the interpreter cannot assume that such implicatures
are an undeniable part of the public record. We have argued this test can
be achieved within finite games by extending the game to include a signal
(and its attendant coherent interpretation) that monotonically entail the
implicature.
Our model of safety predicts that unlike (1d), interpreting (1d′) as an
indirect answer is safe.
(1) d′. Bronston: Only my company had an account, for about six months,
in Zurich.
(1d′) must be connected to a prior segment to make an antecedent alternatives
set available for only. As before, the salient interpretation among the possible
coherent alternatives is IQAP(c, d′); we test its safety by extending the game
frame with a direct answer s3. In contrast to (1d), interpreting (1d
′) as iqap
does not rely on a scalar implicature borne from Bronston providing all
relevant information to yield the negative answer. Instead, it simply relies
on an assumption that (1d′) is attached to (1c): this resolves the alternatives
set to {bronston, company}, thereby making (1d′) imply a negative answer
thanks to the lexical semantics of only. But the signal s3 relies on exactly
the same assumption — that it attach to (1c) — to entail an answer. So (s3,
qap) cannot be strictly dispreferred by B to (1d′, iqap). That is, in contrast
to (1d), including s3 in the game does not compel P to revise his model of
B’s preferences over iqap and hence his own preferences too: the default
inference that (1d′) commits Bronston to an answer is therefore safe.
Our model also accounts for cases where coherence isn’t preserved like
(6). Sheehan’s responses cannot connect to the questions with IQAP. While
the antecedent to the gl axiom (5) is satisfied, its consequent is inconsistent
with compositional semantics. Instead, coherent interpretations of Sheehan’s
response (6b) that are consistent with its compositional semantics include
one that provides Commentary on it and one where it’s not rhetorically
connected to (6a) at all. Both of these implicate a refusal to answer. This
implicature is safe because it is preferred to the novel move I refuse to answer
thanks to politeness considerations (it is less confrontational to implicate
the rejection of another agent’s goal than to express it explicitly).
7 Related work
Our theory differs from Gricean accounts in two fundamental ways. First
we have derived Gricean cooperativity from a more general game-theoretic
axiomatisation of human behaviour that also handles non-cooperative conver-
sation. We have replaced Gricean formalisations that adopt plan recognition
techniques or shared intentions (e.g., Grosz & Sidner (1990), Allen & Litman
(1987), Lochbaum (1998)) with a formalisation in terms of shared preferences,
thereby allowing rejection and denial to be content-cooperative when the
agents’ conflicting beliefs yield conflicting optimal solutions (or, equivalently,
intentions) for achieving their shared preferences. In addition, we have re-
placed Gricean derivations of implicatures based on shared intentions with a
different picture in which discourse coherence and its attendant implicatures
emerge as a rational preference.
Game theory offers rational reconstructions of cooperative conversational
implicatures (e.g., Parikh (2001), van Rooij (2004), Benz, Jäger & van Rooij
(2005), Asher, Sher & Williams (2001)). But instead of treating cooperativity as
a starting point, our model makes it a special case. Our approach refines and
extends the Grounding Acts Model of dialogue (Traum 1994) by providing a
logical underpinning to its update rules (Poesio & Traum 1997): the update
rules articulate particular effects on content and on cognitive states of various
dialogue actions; our model makes such effects derivable and moreover
provides a basis for articulating additional update rules for non-cooperative
moves.
Our work draws from the literature on signalling games (e.g., Crawford
& Sobel 1982, Farrell 1993, Lipman 2003, Lipman & Seppi 1995). We bring to
this work a more sophisticated mapping of signals to meaning: the overly
simple signalling models used in prior work don’t distinguish between what is
literally said from what is implicated, and therefore cannot make locutionary
content safe and implied content unsafe, which we argued is crucial to un-
derstanding examples like (1). Prior signalling models also fail to distinguish
credible inference from safe inference, because either the signal is taken to
mean whatever it is optimal for it to mean, or, as in Farell’s (1993) model,
the mapping from signal to meaning is completely fixed, which ignores the
complex interplay of pragmatics, semantics and strategic reasoning.
Pinker, Nowak & Lee (2008) use game theory to predict when plausible
deniability is optimal, making implicating content preferable to explicitly
expressing it. But their linguistic model does not use constraints on interpre-
tation from discourse coherence, and so they don’t distinguish the plausible
deniability of the implied answer in (1d) vs. (1d′). We also showed how exploit-
ing coherence avoids the need for testing an unlimited number of equilibria
for safety, thanks to the finite number of coherence relations in the ontology
(e.g., in sdrt there are around 30 relations) and the finite ways in which the
semantics of such relations can fix the underspecified aspects of meaning
revealed by linguistic form (e.g., the finite number of antecedents that they
make available to anaphora). This paper has not addressed, however, how
one might evaluate the credibility of a message: in other words, we have not
provided a model that predicts when a (safe) interpretation of a speaker’s
signal matches his beliefs about the world, and when it doesn’t.
Franke, de Jager & van Rooij (2009) analyse non-cooperative conversation
by adapting the principle of optimal relevance from Relevance Theory (Sper-
ber & Wilson 1995) within classical game theory. Their account is incomplete,
with no formal details of the adapted principle. Providing the formal details
will be problematic, we think, because inferences in classical game theory rely
on complete information about preferences and this isn’t always plausible in
conversation. A similar observation applies to the game-theoretic approach to
political debate in Klebanov & Beigman 2010 and to work on dialogue games
(e.g., Amgoud 2003, MacKenzie 1979, McBurney & Parsons 2002, Walton &
Krabbe 1995, Wooldridge 2000). Models of decisions in partially observable
environments have been developed (e.g., Roth, Simmons & Veloso (2006)). But
while these endow agents with uncertainty about the current state and the
outcomes of actions, they still rely on full knowledge of the possible states
and preferences over them, which isn’t always realistic for dialogue agents. In
contrast to these approaches, the utilities for each possible dialogue move in
our cl need not be pre-defined or quantified. Skyrms (1994, 2004) models the
adoption of linguistic conventions in the absence of complete information
about preferences within an evolutionary framework. We are working at
a different level of analysis, however, because we are interested not only
in basic dispositions to linguistic behaviour but also how this behaviour
may change in the light of information brought to bear just in the current
conversation and through reasoning.
Franke (2010) takes an epistemic approach to pragmatic interpretation.
He adopts a slightly different game-theoretic solution concept, known as
Iterated Best Response or ibr. But the more important differences concern
the underlying conception of the game. He uses a signalling game in which
the conventional meaning sL of the speaker’s message s is a subset of
speaker types and hence denotes the states of affairs in which s is true.
But he does not consider aspects of linguistic meaning that have to do with
coherence as we do, and so he does not distinguish between the meaning
of the signal based only on lexical and compositional semantics and what
we have called the message m whose content incorporates elements derived
from inferences about coherence. For Franke, sL = mM and both are
fixed and monotonic. Implicatures arise as beliefs because ibr predicts an
optimal interpretation that is different from sL : for example, it may be more
specific than sL (i.e., α
∗(s) ⊂ sL ; e.g., scalar implicatures); or not (i.e.,
α∗(s) 6⊆ sL , making the message incredible and the speaker insincere). In
our model, the receiver’s action is to determine what the public commitment
of the speaker is, independently of whether he finds the message credible
or not. Because inferences about coherence can depend on strategic factors,
modelling safety becomes necessary. One must test one’s inferences about
what mM is, because its value is computed under uncertainty with partial
information (like all inferences about coherence are). Consequently, the
linguistic meaning of the message .M can and does get revised as agents
reason about the game. More generally, while we acknowledge that some
pragamtic inferences are epistemic in nature (e.g., see Sincerity), we take
pragmatic inferences that occur through establishing coherence to be a
matter of public commitment, and not simply a matter of updating one’s
model of the private mental attitudes of the speaker, as Franke does. It is
only because we treat certain pragmatic inferences as surfacing in public
commitments that we can distinguish between perjury convictions for (1d)
(interpreting it as putting an answer on the public record isn’t safe) vs. (1d′)
(interpreting it as putting an answer on the public record is defeasible, but
safe).
Constraints imposed by discourse coherence, which we believe is a key
and primitive component of any good model of conversation, limit the size
of the game; coherence, allows us to estimate what actions are irrelevant
and therefore can be excluded from reasoning. This reduces the complexity
problem of computing an optimal and safe interpretation of a signal and
makes it workable, even when a player has partial information about the
interpretation game that he’s playing.
8 Conclusions
We have argued that any model of strategic conversation must distinguish
between the public commitments one makes through utterances and private
mental states that affect and are affected by them; it must make discourse
coherence a key and primitive principle for reasoning about the speaker’s
public commitments; and it must acknowledge that computing the speaker’s
public commitments is often based on defeasible inference. It must also allow
for several levels of cooperativity; strategic conversation typically exhibits
only some of them. We focused on cooperativity and lack thereof at the level
of interpretation.
We introduced the concept of safety, which provides a sufficient condition
for what content of an utterance is a matter of public record. We distin-
guished this notion from the game theoretic notion of credibility, which tests
whether the content of a message can be believed. Safe implicatures must be
part of public commitments, while those that are not may be defensibly de-
nied. The inference to an indirect answer from the signal (1d) is not safe, and
though the implicature is reasonable (it is optimal in the small interpretation
game), we have shown that Bronston could defensibly have denied that he
was committed to the implicature.
We proposed two alternative game-theoretic models for evaluating safety.
Both models involve making the game of sufficient size (in terms of the
set of signals that the speaker is taken to be contemplating). Both models
crucially rely on discourse coherence: coherence determines when a game is
of sufficient size to make interpretations safe, but not so large that computing
optimal interpretations becomes unworkable. But the two models are also
quite different. The first model from Section 4 uses standard tools of non-
cooperative games. The second (see Sections 5 and 6) is a symbolic qualitative
model that makes safe interpretation a byproduct of sound nonmonotonic
inference generally: safety is the strategic counterpart to the methodological
principle that one must consider all relevant evidence before drawing any
conclusion based on defeasible principles. In essence, the symbolic model
offers a correspondence result between a nonmonotonic theory for computing
optimal moves and a game theoretic model.
We showed the qualitative model in contexts where the agents share
preferences to be equivalent to the Gricean Principles of Section 2. This
shows that games which are subject to the Gricean Principles are a strict
subset of all interpretation games. It also allowed us to show that in such
Gricean environments, we can use smaller strategic reasoning games to
compute interpretations that are optimal, safe and credible. So Gricean
cooperativity is in some sense more efficient.
While we have a correspondence theorem for Gricean Cooperative games,
we don’t have one for non cooperative conversational games. The naturally
occurring examples that motivated our model exhibit only a tiny fraction
of the full range of strategic moves. But the lack of available empirical
data means no one even knows what those are. Our framework thus invites
extensive empirical work on strategic conversations, something we plan to
do.
Appendix
CP-nets. Our proofs of Facts 1 and 2 rely on the fact that the preference
statements we described in Section 5 are in fact partial descriptions of CP-
nets (Boutilier et al. 2004, Domshlak 2002). So we start with a brief overview
of CP-nets, focussing on the aspects of their language and logic relevant to
our proofs.
A CP-net has two components: a directed conditional preference graph
(cpg), which defines for each variable V its set of parent variables Pa(V) that
affect the agent’s preferences over V ’s values; and a conditional preference
table (cpt), which specifies for each variable V the agent’s preferences over
V ’s values, given every combination of values in Pa(V). A CP-net for a game
consists of a CP-net for each player.
For example, the cpg corresponding to the example cpt given in (12) is
the following:
M
O

C

S
To maximise compactness, we have assumed S takes three values s1, s2, s3
(and similarly M takes three values) rather than showing the cpg over the six
boolean variables themselves.
While dependencies among variables can be read off the cpt, many theo-
rems concerning equilibria strategies and the complexity in computing them
are dependent on the properties of the cpg; e.g., whether it contains cycles
(e.g., see Apt, Rossi & Venable 2005 for details). Our proofs of Fact 2 will
likewise exploit the configuration of the cpg (i.e., whether or not it contains
cycles) and indeed will proceed by induction on the cpg.
As we said in Section 5.1, the logic of CP-nets follows the following
two ranked principles when generating the preference order over every
combination of actions from this compact representation: first, one prefers
values that violate as few conditional preferences as possible; and second,
violating a (conditional) preference on a parent variable is worse than violating
the preference on a daughter variable. Research on CP-nets has yielded highly
efficient methods that capture at least some Nash Equilibria (ne).17 CP-nets
also have a lot of expressive power: Apt, Rossi & Venable (2005) show that
there is a translation of games into CP-nets, where a game has an ne a just
in case a is an optimal solution of its CP-net.
Outline Proof of Fact 1
Sincerity: (Pa,Dφ∧GC) > Baφ
Assume that all the normal GC consequences hold; we show that the conclu-
sion must hold. Accordingly, suppose Pa,Dφ and GC hold. We assume also
that φ expresses a proposition that is capable of being believed. By Intent
to Share Commitment, it defeasibly follows that Pa,DIaBbφ for any b ∈ D.
By the first part of GC, the coherence relations that one normally infers in gl
and their associated speech act related goals (or sargs) are assumed to hold.
So IaBbφ for any b ∈ D. By Maximising Utility and the fact that I is an
S4 modality, IaBbφ defeasibly implies Bbφ ≻a ¬Bbφ. By the second clause
of GC, Bbφ ≻b ¬Bbφ.
We assume that preferences over an agent’s beliefs pattern after her
factual preferences:
(1) (Bbφ ≻b ¬Bbφ)↔ (φ ≻b ¬φ)
So φ ≻b ¬φ. By GC again, we have φ ≻a ¬φ. By our assumption (1), we have
(2) Baφ ≻a ¬Baφ.
We claim that a should normally believe φ in all the normal worlds picked out
by our assumptions and axioms, if he prefers in reflective equilibrium to have
the belief states he in fact has. For ¬Baφ would imply ¬Baφ ≻a Baφ, which
contradicts (2). So we have defeasibly deduced Baφ from the premises (plus
the assumption that (1) is a valid axiom of the logic). Now, Weak Deduction
is a valid rule of the weak conditional > (Asher 1995): if Γ ,φ |∼ψ, Γ |∼/ ψ and
17 See for instance Bonzon 2007 for results on acyclic nets.
Γ |∼/ ¬(φ > ψ) then Γ |∼ (φ > ψ). Conditionalising on the reasoning from the
assumptions to Baφ, we have (Pa,Dφ∧GC) |∼Baφ. ✷.
Sincerity for Intentions: (Pa,DIaφ∧GC) > Iaφ
Suppose Pa,DIaφ ∧ GC. By Sincerity (which we’ve just proved), BaIaφ.
Assuming that intentions are doxastically transparent (i.e., BaIaφ → Iaφ)
yields the result with an application of Weak Deduction. ✷.
Sincerity for Preferences is proved in a similar way, using also the
assumption that preferences are doxastically transparent. ✷.
Competence: (Pa,Dφ∧ Pb,D?φ∧ a,b ∈ D)→ ((BbBaφ∧GC) > Bbφ)
Suppose Pb,D?φ∧ Pa,Dφ∧ b ∈ D ∧BbBaφ and we are in a GC environment.
Given the first condition in Definition 5 on GC games, the intention that
normally underlies asking a question (to know an answer) and Maximis-
ing Utility ensures that b’s asking a question implies Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ ≻b
¬(Bbφ∨Bb¬φ). So by GC (i.e., the agents’ preferences normally align), we
also have: Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ ≻a ¬(Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ). By Maximising Utility
we can assume that b’s asking a question together with a’s response are
both optimal moves in equilibrium. These moves then should realise the
preference Bbφ∨Bb¬φ ≻b ¬(Bbφ∨Bb¬φ). Furthermore, by Sincerity,
Baφ. There are two choices now: either a is trustworthy or not. If a is not
trustworthy, then his commitment to φ is no indication of its truth. But then
there is an equilibrium move (do not ask a whether φ) that would have been
more advantageous for b (given that listening to someone and processing
the response is a cost). So given that Pb,D?φ is the equilibrium move, b must
believe a to be trustworthy, and so Bbφ. Using Weak Deduction thus yields
Competence. ✷.
Cooperativity: (b ∈ D ∧ Pa,DIaφ∧GC) > Ibφ
Assume b ∈ D ∧ Pa,DIaφ ∧ GC. By Sincerity for Intentions, we have
Iaφ. By Maximising Utility, we can infer CP-solutiona(φ,G), where G is
the GC game with at least a and b as players. By GC and Competence, this
defeasibly entails CP-solutionb(φ,G). And so Maximising Utility yields
Ibφ. Using Weak Deduction gets us the desired > statement. ✷.
Outline Proof of Fact 2
We need to show two things for G to be GC: 1) that in G, players normally
have the intentions that are conventionally associated with the speech acts
they perform; and 2) that preferences normally align. Proving 1) is relatively
straightforward, assuming that each contribution is made with certain con-
versational goals in mind that are known by all conversational participants.
Thus, if a player asks a question, the commonly known default conversational
goal associated with that speech act is that the speaker intends to have a
true and informative answer to the question. By cooperativity of intentions,
it follows that the player issuing a response to the question will adopt such
a goal, and by rationality will try to realise that goal with an appropriate
speech act — e.g., answering the question or saying that he has not enough
information to answer it. Similar reasoning applies to other speech acts and
conversational goals.
Part 2 is more involved. We prove it by induction on the complexity of
the preferences of agents — i.e., by induction over the complexity of CP-nets.
What we prove is this: that CP-nets over publicly committed preferences
are isomorphic as long as the CP-nets are realistic in the following sense:
ψ : φ ≻n ¬φ → Bn(ψ → ✸φ). In words: if player n prefers φ over ¬φ in a
context ψ, then he believes that φ is consistent with ψ being true. Because
the preferences are public commitments, we can take them to be mutually
believed given Sincerity and Competence (for a proof of this fact, see Asher
& Lascarides 2008).
Lemma 1
If the Gricean Principles hold in a game G, and the players’
CP-nets are acyclic and realistic, then normally they are
isomorphic.
If a CP-net is acyclic, the inductive rank of a given CP-net is obvious, and the
proof is straightforward. We assume both players have a simplest CP-net
with just one variable and it contains just one preference statement without
any dependencies, which in Boolean terms is of the form ψ ≻n ¬ψ for player
n. Suppose B2(ψ ≻1 ¬ψ). Then by Mutual Belief, B1B2(ψ ≻1 ¬ψ). By
Competence, B1(ψ ≻1 ¬ψ). Since preferences are doxastically transparent,
ψ ≻1 ¬ψ. Since the CP-net is realistic, ψ is belief compliant, i.e., B1✸ψ.
By Mutual Belief, B2B1✸ψ and so B2✸ψ, by Competence. Since ψ is belief
compliant, in the CP-net for 1, ψ is a CP-net solution, and so by Maximise
Utility I1ψ. By Cooperativity of Intentions, I2ψ. By Maximise Utility
and the fact that ψ is belief compliant for 2, ψ is the CP-net solution for 2.
Since the CP-net has only 1 variable, ψ ≻2 ¬ψ. A similar situation holds for
player 2’s commitments to preferences.
Now for the inductive step. Suppose that players 1 and 2 agree on pref-
erences in their CP-nets up to rank k. Now consider an acyclic CP-net of
rank k + 1 with a new variable ψ, which depends on some Boolean combi-
nation of values φ and φ′ in a subnet of rank i < k. Assume B2(φ : ψ ≻1
¬ψ∧φ′ : ¬ψ ≻1 ψ). By the induction hypothesis player 1 and 2’s preferences
align over φ and φ′, and then our prior reasoning for the base step completes
the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2
If the players in a game G adopt the Gricean Principles and
their CP-nets have a simple cycle and are realistic, normally
their CP-nets are isomorphic.
If the CP-nets involved have cycles, the proof is more involved because
cycles render problematic the rank of a CP-net. But if we consider a simple
cyclic net with two variables, we can get alignment of preferences in either
of two ways. Consider a game with 2 players again, where 1 has without
loss of generality, φ : ψ ≻1 ¬ψ, ¬φ : ¬ψ ≻ ψ, and player 2 has ψ : φ ≻2 ¬φ
and ¬ψ : ¬φ ≻2 φ, where 1 controls ψ and 2 controls φ. These preference
statements mean that we have a dependency of φ on ψ and ψ on φ. We have
two CP-net solutions: φ∧ψ and ¬ψ∧¬φ. Using the reasoning of the acyclic
case for each agent, we can get them to the point:
I1φ : ψ ≻1 ¬ψ∧ I1¬φ : ¬ψ ≻1 ψ
I2ψ : φ ≻2 ¬φ∧ I2¬ψ : ¬φ ≻2 φ
By Cooperativity of Intentions, then, they mutually adopt the other’s inten-
tions so that we have
I1,2φ : ψ ≻1 ¬ψ∧ I1,2¬φ : ¬ψ ≻1 ψ
I1,2ψ : φ ≻2 ¬φ∧ I1,2¬ψ : ¬φ ≻2 φ
This shows that they have aligned preferences.
Finally, we can decompose every CP-net into a set of cyclically dependent
variables, the associated tables of which are acyclic. By treating each cycle as
a unit, we can now turn the CP-net into an acyclic one. By doing induction
on the size of the cycles using Lemma 2 and on the rank of the transformed
CP-net using Lemma 1, the general result follows. ✷
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